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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research was to empirically examine the impacts that the 
presence of a state trading enterprise (STE) has in the international wheat market. 
There are numerous types of STEs that function in different ways to achieve many 
different types of policy objectives which are often unique to a particular STE. 
Although the existence of a STE is justified by the countries involved using 
numerous policy rationales, the fear that they are used as a front for trade 
protectionism is a prevalent concern. One specific aspect of a STE that often brings 
this concern to the forefront is whether or not the STE has the exclusive privilege of 
monopoly status. 
The empirical objective of this thesis was to determine specifically if the use 
of a STE exporter has had a positive impact on world wheat trade over the 1970 – 
2005 period and if the use of a STE importer has had a negative impact. In addition, 
the marginal impact of the STE having monopoly status was tested. In all cases, the 
designation of STEs and their monopoly status is based on WTO notification 
documentations. To secure econometrically robust results, a modified conventional 
gravity model was chosen. This model was estimated using pooled OLS and fixed 
effects, the latter consisting of both time and country pair fixed effects. The data that 
was constructed was a large panel data set of bilateral wheat trade spanning from 
1970 to 2005. The model was also tested on a number of subsamples representing 
countries at different stages of development and in different income categories to 
isolate potential differences in STEs objectives and impacts. 
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In virtually all models, the presence of a STE exporter had a strongly 
significant and positive effect on the value and volume of wheat exports from the 
country with the STE exporter. The fact that a STE had monopoly status did not 
have any additional impact on wheat trade. The impact of STE importers was 
insignificant. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1    General Problem 
 Trade agreements, technology improvements and enhanced ability to 
communicate have allowed significant advancements in 20
th
 century economies 
with the potential for full globalization where each country focuses on their 
strengths. Countries trade because it is advantageous to do so. Both the classical 
literature and the new trade literature reveal that economic welfare is increased 
through trade. Countries differ in their endowments of natural resources and 
production factors. Becoming specialized in producing products which use more 
intensively the factors in which a country has relatively greater productivity, and 
exporting them, results in higher incomes. This is because the specialization allows 
each country to export their surpluses and to import those things that others can 
produce more effectively, according to their comparative advantage. It is generally 
understood that this long run solution is optimal. It is further understood that 
government policies can affect the quantity and price of production inputs thereby 
altering which industry might develop a productivity advantage in a particular 
country. These policies come in a variety of forms and it is sometimes argued that 
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policies affect other countries‟ or sectors‟ ability to compete and thus have 
undesirable welfare effects. One trade policy option that has been suspect is the use 
of state trading enterprises (STEs) in international trade as agencies for importing 
and exporting. 
There is legitimate theoretical concern regarding the role of STEs in 
international agricultural trade. Fundamental is the concern that STEs, by way of 
their exclusive rights or privileges, are anticompetitive. Further, some suspect that 
STEs provide a front for hidden protection for domestic agriculture. If this assertion 
is true, then gains from trade reform in the World Trade Organization (WTO), such 
as reducing tariffs and export subsidies, may be limited if STEs remain 
unchallenged. Indeed, it is believed that failure to recognize and directly address the 
role of STEs has hindered the WTO‟s ability to increase the free flow of agricultural 
trade (IPC Position Paper No. 9, 1999).  These concerns, among others, are expected 
to be tabled for future WTO negotiations.  
In late 2007 the rules of regulation surrounding STEs will likely be 
negotiated at the WTO. The following is an excerpt from the revised draft of the 
modalities for agriculture as of August 1, 2007. The proposed changes to the 
legislation surrounding STE exporters call for the elimination of: 
(i) those export subsidies, defined by Article 1(e) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which are currently provided to or by an agricultural 
exporting state trading enterprise; 
 
(ii) government financing of exporting state trading enterprises, 
preferential access to capital or other special privileges with respect 
to government financing or refinancing facilities, borrowing, lending 
or government guarantees for commercial borrowing or lending, at 
below market rates; and 
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(iii) government underwriting of losses, either directly or indirectly, 
losses or reimbursement of the costs or write-downs or write-offs of 
debts owed to, or by export state trading enterprises on their export 
sales 
 
(iv) by 2013, the use of export monopoly powers for such enterprises. 
 
        (WTO, 2007) 
 
However, it is not likely that all the WTO countries will agree on all these 
items. In order for any real progress to be made in trade negotiations, a few issues 
surrounding the impacts of STEs on trade need to be resolved. The lack of 
consensus about their impacts is due in part to the lack of clarity regarding the 
definition of STEs, and is compounded further by the absence of an accepted body 
of economic theory relating to STEs (McCorriston and MacLaren, 2001). As a 
result, there still exists a gap in establishing an agreed upon benchmark or 
classification scheme by which STE activities can be gauged in determining their 
potential to distort trade. McCorriston and MacLaren conclude:  
Overall, the key conclusion is the need for careful empirical work on both 
the practices and the effects of state trading enterprises (McCorriston and 
MacLaren, 2001, Pg.56). 
 
Acquiring access to foreign markets is extremely important in order to 
realize the potential gains from liberating world trade in agriculture. Currently, there 
are a number of different types of marketing institutions involved in marketing 
agricultural and food products. This includes small private businesses, large national 
and multinational firms, and STEs. In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is 
the largest and most influential STE. The CWB has single-desk status in the export 
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of barley, wheat, and durum from the Canadian prairies, which represents the largest 
grouping of agricultural exports from this country. It has been shown that such an 
organization is beneficial to some producers by returning a premium to them beyond 
that which could be obtained in a multiple seller environment (Kraft et al. 1996). 
The ability of the organization to do so is connected to its ability of the STE 
retaining of single desk status.  
In Canada today the debate has surfaced again. Several producer groups are 
convinced that the CWB is a significant stumbling block that inhibits a structural 
change consisting of value adding, crop development and individual market access. 
The Government of Canada set up an industry task force to provide 
recommendations on how to remove the single desk yet maintain a viable wheat 
board. The report outlined how there a producer/investor owned agency could be 
created but acknowledged that without regulation granting monopoly status to the 
producer organization it would likely not succeed in its current structure (Migie, et 
al., 2006). The motivation for considering this change is to offer Canadian 
producers the ability to sell their production of wheat and malt barley outside of the 
single desk.  
Another aspect is that countries using STEs are sometimes challenged by 
trade partners.  For example, in Canada the CWB has experienced numerous trade 
challenges for alleged trade injury. In 2004, the WTO ruled in favour of the CWB 
which was being challenged by the U.S. This case was initiated by the U.S. Trade 
Representative on December 17
th
, 2002. The U.S. had challenged the CWB on three 
aspects. Only one was directly pointed at the CWB alleging that the CWB was 
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operating inconsistently with respect to the Act itself. In a statement, the WTO 
panel concluded that: 
“[t]he U.S. has failed to establish its claim that 
Canada has breached its obligations under Article 
XVII:1 of the GATT 1994 because the CWB Export 
Regime necessarily results in the CWB making export 
sales that are not in accordance with the principles of 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) of Article XVII:1” (WTO, 
2004 - WT/DS276/R, 2004). 
The essence of this finding is that the CWB was not in violation of operating outside 
the definition of exclusive rights or privileges granted by the state.   
Similar challenges and ambiguities exist for STE importers as well. 
Countries that import agricultural commodities and food products may use various 
forms of institutions to secure a stable supply chain into their country. STEs in the 
import business are often used to facilitate transactions, maintain a stable supply 
chain or for health and safety reasons. However, importing STEs could also be used 
as a tool to administer certain forms of trade barriers that would limit access to their 
domestic market. It is commonly argued that trade inhibiting STEs reduce access to 
markets for potential exporters.  In Japan, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) controls the importation and pricing of most 
imported wheat. Casual empirical research suggests minimal evidence that STEs 
affect import levels. At best, it shows that some STEs are not as responsive to 
choices of supply when market conditions change as other non-institutionalized 
traders might be (Abbott and Young, 1999).    
 As earlier mentioned, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
have raised the issue of the trade distorting behaviour of the CWB. In particular 
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some countries, namely the U.S. and the European Union wish to see the single-
desk authority of the CWB weakened or removed totally. Their opposition is based 
on a belief that the CWB enhances Canada‟s ability to export wheat. Today, most 
studies that have tried to measure the impact of STEs are still subject to intense 
scrutiny. There is no compelling empirical evidence showing that STEs affect trade, 
all else constant. The reason for the lack of clarity, let alone a unified perspective on 
the impact of STEs, is that little comprehensive empirical work has been done in 
regard to testing the impact of STE. Making generalized statements about a dynamic 
type of institution can lead to poor policy recommendations. STEs are used in 
countries all over the globe, for a diverse range of commodities and with multiple 
objectives. It is important to engage in a comprehensive analysis to assess the 
influence of STEs international wheat trade.    
 1.2    Objective and Hypothesis 
 There are two questions this research project will address. First, do exporting 
state trading enterprises affect the value or volume wheat exports?  The answer to 
this question will be based on observing whether any increases or decreases in 
exports are the result of the presence of STEs or whether they are attributable to a 
range of other factors that stimulate trade.  This will inform the debate on the 
influence of the CWB on Canada‟s wheat exports. Second, do state-trading 
importers affect other importers or limit market access of potential exports of 
wheat? For example, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
which is widely suspected of limiting wheat imports. This research project will 
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provide a comprehensive econometric study of the effect of STEs on world wheat 
trade. It is the purpose of this study to empirically measure the extent to which state 
trading enterprises (STEs), on both the import and export side, affect (positively or 
negatively) trade flows.  
Formally, 
HO.1:  A STE Exporter is able to significantly increase the value of wheat 
trade originating from the export country. 
 
HO.2: A STE Importer is able to significantly decrease the value of wheat 
trade destined for the import country 
 
A secondary consideration is whether the legislation granting monopoly status to 
certain STE has an additional marginal impact.  
HO.1a:  A STE Exporter with monopoly status is able to additionally increase 
the value of wheat trade originating from the export country. 
 
HO.2a: A STE Importer with monopoly status is able to additionally decrease 
the value of wheat trade destined for the import country. 
1.5    Definition and Classifications 
One of the exceptionally difficult challenges in the debate is finding 
consensus on what constitutes a STE. The WTO defines a STE as:  
"Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing 
boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, 
including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they 
influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports 
or exports" (GATT
 
, 2006).  
 
There have been various attempts to make this broad and general definition more 
operational. The size, structure, operations, power, extent of government 
involvement in, and functions, of STEs vary widely as seen in Table 1.1.   
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Table 1.1: Types, Objectives and Functions of STEs 
Five Types of STE Objectives of STE Selected Functions of STE 
Statutory Marketing 
Boards  
 
Export Marketing 
Boards 
 
Regulatory Marketing 
Boards 
 
Canalizing Agencies  
 
Foreign Trade 
Enterprises/Organizatio
ns 
- income support for 
domestic producers; 
 
price stabilization; 
 
expansion of domestic 
output; 

continuity of domestic 
food supply; 

increase in government 
revenue; 

control of foreign trade 
operations, achieving  
economies of scale 
and scope, and improving 
the terms of trade; 

protection of public 
health; 

management of domestic 
resources; and 

fulfillment of 
international commitments 
on quantity and/or price 
 
importing and exporting; 
issuing permits for importation or 
exportation; 
enforcing the statutory 
requirements of an agricultural 
marketing scheme and/or 
stabilization arrangement; 
authorizing/ management of 
domestic production; 
authorizing/managing the 
processing of domestic production; 
determining the purchase/sales 
price of domestic production; 
handling domestic distribution of 
domestic production/imports; 
effecting purchases and sales of 
domestic production based upon 
pre-determined floor and ceiling 
prices; 
issuing credit guarantees for 
producers/processors; 
engaging in exporting activities 
and supporting activities (storage, 
shipping); 
exercising quality control 
functions for exports; 
engaging in marketing and 
promotional activities for 
exports/domestic consumption; 
maintaining emergency stocks of 
certain strategic/agricultural goods; 
negotiating/administering long-
term bilateral contracts for 
exports/imports;  
undertaking activities necessary 
to fulfill contractual obligations 
entered into by government  
Source: McCorriston and McLaren ( 2001). - Summarization of Points.
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There is significant overlap in all of the categories. The STE may be a 
hybrid of the different types, managing several of the selected objectives using 
many different combinations of the different functions.  
Another source of difficulty with definitions is the fact that STEs are used as 
instruments to achieve different forms of agricultural policy objectives (Veeman et 
al. 1999). Lack of clarity surrounding the definition of STEs has made analysis of 
the same difficult. Detailed knowledge of how various STEs are organized, along 
with their roles in domestic and international markets, is essential in order to 
evaluate their performance or impact on trade (OECD, 2001).  
The rationale for classifying STEs stems from the notion that the activities of 
some STEs are more distorting than others. Thus a classification scheme is intended 
to be instrumental in differentiating which STEs have the greatest potential to distort 
markets and require restructuring, and those that are inconsequential to the quantity 
or direction of trade. Different classification schemes have been proposed based on 
differing criteria. Two schemes are considered here to illustrate the lack of 
consensus which surrounds categorizing STEs. 
  Dixit and Josling (1997) classify STEs in terms of their ability to distort 
trade. Since activities of STEs vary widely, they focus on the most trade distorting 
enterprises. An inventory of the most trade distorting STEs would enable the WTO 
to focus negotiations on the STEs that are the most offending.  Four different 
combinations of control over domestic and trade markets, and their potential to 
distort trade are illustrated by Dixit and Josling (see Table 1.2).  
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Table 1.2: Classification Typology for STE based on Market Control 
  Characterization           
Quantitative 
Trade 
Controls 
Domestic 
Market 
Controls 
Potential for 
Trade Distortion 
Type I 
Market Promotion 
Board None None Negligible 
Type II 
Domestic Control 
Board None Yes Low 
Type III Trade Control Board Yes None 
High To 
Moderate 
Type IV Total Control Board Yes Yes High 
Source: Dixit and Josling (1997). 
 
 The first STE category (Type I) is called a Market Promotion Board. 
Without any control in domestic or international markets, this type of STE usually 
focuses on promoting, and controlling the quality of specific commodities. Thus its 
potential to distort trade is negligible. An example would be the Canadian Canola 
Council.  
 The second type of STE is classified as a Domestic Control Board, having 
market power only in the domestic market. These boards often prevent over-supply 
on the domestic market, or ensure equitable distribution of scarce supplies. An 
example of this would be the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in the U.S. The 
way the CCC operates is that it offered farmers a loan rate on their grain when sold 
to the CCC. If the market price was not above the loan rate the CCC paid, the CCC 
would then acquire the farmers‟ grain which would have to be given away or sold 
(Simonot, D. 1997).  
 The third type of STE could be called an International Trade Control Board. 
Having control over exports and/or imports they can use their market power over 
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trade to achieve an internal (price) objective. This agency operates in a competitive 
domestic industry but is under control in the export and import business.  The 
Canadian Dairy Commission is, and the Australian Wheat Board was, an example of 
this category of STE. Indirectly they can influence the domestic market. By 
monopolizing exports and/or imports of the commodities they handle they can keep 
the domestic price where it “needs” to be for a particular policy objective. Export 
monopolist‟s activities, with respect to other sellers often results in trade conflicts. 
Without any domestic market control, this type is often not challenged in 
negotiations when their objective is to keep the domestic market price low for 
domestic consumers.  
 Type IV STEs control both domestic and international markets. This 
category could be labelled a Total Market Control Board. The potential trade-
distorting effects of STEs in this category are larger than other three types, but are 
dependent upon how the STEs use market power in international and domestic 
markets (Josling, 2002). This category includes the Canadian Wheat Board products 
for human consumption or Indonesia‟s BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistic Nasional).  
 Dixit and Josling have been criticized for the lack of objectivity (OECD, 
2001), and usefulness, of the standards used in their classification scheme. Veeman 
et al (1999) contend that more useful criteria examine indicators of market 
contestability, upon which their own classification scheme is based (see Table 1.3). 
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 Criteria used to measure market contestability include: first, the extent to 
which STEs face competition from private traders in export markets as well as 
domestic markets (single-desk status); second, the STE‟s share of import and/or 
export markets; and third, the openness of an exporting country‟s market to imports. 
It has been noted that the criteria used to classify STEs based upon their potential 
impact on agricultural markets, as suggested by Veeman et al., may be subject to 
criticism since no consensus exists on determining objective criteria (OECD, 2001).  
 In Table 1.3, the STEs are classified into categories based on the WTOs 
classification of a support program‟s ability to distort trade. The colour designation 
of the boxes reflects the urgency with which a program needs to be dealt with to 
reduce trade distorting effects. Those programs or institutions that are classified as 
Red box are understood to be very distorting and cannot be allowed. The Amber 
box contains those forms of support that need to be reduced or changed and the 
Green box programs are acceptable. 
Table 1.3: Classification Typology for STE based on Market Contestability 
STE Class Import STE that: Export STE that: 
Type I (Green) STE 
The market is contestable i. Face competition in the domestic 
market and control less than 33% of 
domestic market sales 
i. Face competition in the export market and 
control less than 33% of export market sales 
ii. As i above, and no single desk in the domestic 
market 
iii. As i above and has a single desk in the 
domestic market but the border is open to imports 
Type II (Amber) STE 
Contestability may be 
compromised 
i. Face competition in the domestic 
market but control 33% or more of 
domestic sales 
i. Face competition in the export market but 
control 33% to 49% of world export sales 
ii. Face competition in export markets and have a 
single desk role in the domestic market, but the 
border is not open to imports 
Type III (Red) STE 
Contestability is contravened i. No competition in importation 
ii. As for i, and TRQ and/or MAC 
are administered by the STE 
i. Control 50% or more of world export sales of 
the commodity 
ii. As for i, and has single desk in the domestic 
market 
Source: Veeman et al. (1999). 
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 The purpose of introducing the previous typologies has been to illustrate the 
lack of consensus surrounding the basic definitions of STEs. Considering that Dixit 
and Josling place the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) as a Type 4 STE - one having 
a high potential to distort trade, while Veeman et al. classify the CWB as a Type 1 
STE – one having little potential to distort trade, it is clear that an agreed upon 
typology of STEs does not exist. A benchmark definition of STEs is important if 
reforms are to be targeted towards the STE of concern. 
STEs are an acceptable marketing structure within the WTO.  The debate 
around STEs typically focuses on the activities of the STE.  Since STEs receive 
exclusive or special rights and/or privileges they have become suspect for 
anticompetitive behaviour.  In agriculture, those wishing to see the laws granting 
STEs repealed, argue that they distort trade or have the potential to distort trade. The 
debate regarding STEs first surfaced in the late 1940‟s when leading trading 
countries of the time met to develop an agreement for an International Trade 
Organization (ITO). Subsequent negotiations have endeavoured to achieve modus 
vivendi
1
 that could rule the actions of, and encompass the diversity of objectives 
employed by, STEs. The rules were outlined in the GATT 1947, the only agreement 
coming out of the meetings.  Sixty years later, affected individual countries are still 
seeking consensus on the impact of STEs on trade.  
                                                 
 
1
 Modus vivendi – a compromise, at least temporarily 
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In the context of this research question, the classification reported above 
based on the market contestability would seem most appropriate and the least 
subjective. However, this could potentially be a source of confusion when STEs 
with the same objective are placed into different classifications even if they face the 
same level of competition. The reason is because the extent of competition matters 
could affect the results. A STE operating in the absence of domestic market 
competition (i.e. monopoly status) is believed to have a greater ability to distort 
trade than without monopoly status. Thus, the current research provides empirical 
evidence regarding the impact that STEs have on trade based on the use of STE and 
whether or not it has monopoly status granted to them by the country in which they 
operate in. All STEs and their monopoly status as reported to the WTO are included, 
with no attempt emphasis particular STEs. This is a more comprehensive and 
empirically based means of determining if STEs have had an impact on wheat trade 
than previously concluded. 
The goal of this research is to further contribute to the understanding of the 
impact of STEs on wheat trade between countries. That is, STEs that are defined to 
exist if the WTO has been notified by a trading country that they have a STE. Also, 
the existence of monopoly status is also taken from the notification by the member 
country. 
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1.4     Organization of the Study 
 The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized in the following manner. 
Chapter II outlines the legal text allowing the use of STEs within WTO 
membership. This information leads into an extensive discussion and review of the 
past literature that has endeavoured to assess the impact of STEs generally as well 
as some issues surrounding specific STEs. Chapter III reviews the theory of 
international trade and outlines the theoretical basis for the gravity model. Included 
here is the theoretical gravity model used to test a specific sector of the economy.  
Chapter IV provides a review of the empirical examples that have used gravity 
models in the past to test certain policies. From these examples, an empirical 
specification of gravity model to test STEs in the international wheat market is 
presented. Chapter V presents and describes the results of different empirical 
specification of the wheat trade gravity model. Also provided are the results from 
numerous interesting sub-samples of the data to distinguish STEs by their objectives 
and the type of country they are used in. In Chapter VI conclusions regarding the 
different aspects of this thesis are presented. Included here are acknowledgments of 
the limitations of this work and options for future work in this area.  
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 2.1    Relevant Literature 
2.1.1 Article XVII - GATT 1994 
Within the WTO, STEs must adhere to rules under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) “in their purchases or sales involving either imports or 
exports – are to act in accordance with the general principles of non-discrimination, 
and that commercial considerations only are to guide their decisions on imports and 
exports” (GATT-Article XVII, 1994). Specifically this means that a STE must 
operate in accordance with certain rules, four of which are listed here: 
 1) Non-discrimination, which means that “such enterprises (STE) that make 
any such purchases or sales, must do so solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation 
and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall give other contracting parties 
adequate opportunity to compete for participation in such purchases or sales" 
(GATT- Article XVII, 1994). This makes legal the existence of STEs if they do not 
affect the ability of equal opportunities from someone else who would want to 
engage in this business activity.            
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2) No quantitative restrictions. Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and 
XVIII, 'import restrictions' or 'export restrictions' are discussed. The point is that any 
restrictions imposed as a result of the operations of an STE are not acceptable. Thus 
the law which grants a STE exclusive import rights in a certain product cannot be 
used as a means to limit or stop imports. Further, if the STE refused to import at all, 
they would be in violation of the rule of eliminating import restrictions (Articles XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV, and XVIII). The STE cannot be used as a way to stop imports from 
a certain country or of a certain product completely. 
3) Preservation of the value of tariff concessions. “Article XVII: 4(b) covers 
import monopolies on products which are not the subject of an Article II concession 
(i.e., not included in a GATT Schedule) and sets out that such monopolies shall, on 
request, inform the WTO Members of the import mark-up on the product during a 
recent representative period or of the price charged at resale. The purpose of these 
extra provisions relating to monopolies was to preserve the value of negotiated tariff 
concessions - i.e. to prevent an import monopoly from instituting protection for 
domestic producers” and thereby make reduced tariffs ineffective.  
4) Transparency. “This notification requirement is an essential element in 
the rules on STEs. One reason for notifications is to make it possible for WTO 
member countries to judge the extent to which STEs serve as an alternative to other 
restrictions covered by the General Agreement, e.g. quantitative restrictions, tariffs 
and subsidies. Another purpose of this clause is to allow WTO member countries 
the ability to assess the possible trade distortion resulting from the operations of 
notified STEs” (GATT-Article XVII 1994). The other WTO member countries can 
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evaluate the information that countries allowing STEs to operate must fill out and 
keep record of the STEs operations. This form contains a description of the products 
affected, reason or purpose for establishing/maintaining the STE, summary of the 
legal basis for the granting of the exclusive or special right or privilege to the STE, 
description of the functioning of the STE and statistical information on imports, 
exports and domestic production. 
In the interest of achieving gains from trade, according to the rules and 
regulation define by GATT (1994) STEs should act like a commercial operation and 
not be used to inhibit consumption of a good or mitigate the effectiveness of 
negotiated concessions from protection. STEs must be open to evaluation by 
member countries to maintain integrity. Full adherence to these rules would make 
much of the literature on STEs moot. The challenge exists because many countries 
have differences of opinion as to what the context of the law obligates them to do in 
regards to reporting the activities of STEs, as well as which organizations need to be 
reported. 
2.1.2  Selected Analytical Studies of STE 
The research issues surrounding STEs have included assessing market power 
and the ability to price discriminate. Fundamental in the studies is whether or not 
STEs are adopted because the market in which their activities occur is not perfectly 
competitive. Outcomes of these investigations are often contingent on the 
assumption of the degree of competitiveness within the trade environment.  If the 
market is not competitive, then the role of a STE is not a matter of enhancing the 
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terms of trade but rather an appropriate tool to mitigate the inefficiency effects of 
market power further up the market chain (MaCalla, 1966). The STE can also take a 
homogenous product, and by quality control, additional rents can be extracted based 
on consumer‟s willingness to pay (Kraft et al. 1996).   However, this is also a 
conclusion drawn from the analysis of very particular STEs that would have control 
in the domestic market and who market a product with characteristics that are not 
readily available elsewhere, like Canadian wheat in certain processing 
environments; these conclusions cannot be generalized to include all STEs.  
The same also applies to studies that are pivotal on the notion that the trade 
environment is indeed near perfect competition. Carter and Smith (2001) attest that 
STEs can distort international markets when they operate in a competitive market. 
Their approach is tied to Brander and Spencer‟s (1985) outcome in the new trade 
theory that in some cases the uses of an export subsidy can be welfare enhancing 
given the use of a Cournot type strategy. They found that the use of a single desk in 
the Canadian market may not be welfare enhancing (Carter and Smith, 2001). The 
research findings, which are numerous and often utilize very specific assumptions, 
leave a similar ambiguity, alluded to above, about which characteristics of STEs 
lead to their ability to distort trade. 
One argument that is well-researched is the ability of countries to use STEs 
to combat the effects of subsidies and tariffs in production and distribution of 
agriculture commodities. To outline this concept, the earlier work of Alston and 
Gray (2000) is worth noting.  This study looked at STEs versus export subsides in 
the case of the CWB. Engaging a policy analysis technique developed by Bruce 
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Gardiner (1983) to study policy distribution effects, their work suggests that export 
subsidies and export STEs are similar in several ways. Both policies leave an 
average producer with a return above that of the world price. One key difference in 
the different policies, export subsidy versus STE, is who pays for the policy. It is 
from either direct tax transfer in the case of a subsidy or some gains from price 
discrimination observed in some STE (Alston and Gray, 2000). 
Other examples include the research of Dixit and Josling (1997), who 
developed an analytical framework that addresses the potential for countries to 
misrepresent their commitments to reducing barriers through cross subsidization, 
which is one of the primary concerns about STE. This is achieved through the 
calculation of a subsidy/tariff equivalent for a STE. Any distortionary impacts were 
captured in higher values for the equivalent measure. Ingco and Ng (1998) further 
the debate in light of the Uruguay Rounds and develop a country specific ranking 
system to rank STEs on the extent of control and potential distortions. Their system 
produced a scoring system where STEs are strong, medium or weak.  These ranking 
system do show the frequency with which STEs are used and outlines the potential 
distortions but do not provide a complete analysis of actual distortionary impacts 
based on empirical evidence. 
McCorriston and MacLaren (OECD, 2001) have compiled an exhaustive 
collection of the various studies in their book entitled State Trading Enterprises in 
Agriculture.  There are several ways to analyze STEs; they are theoretical models, 
welfare policy model and simulation models that have focused on measuring trade 
distorting impacts from STEs. After careful scrutiny of the past literature on STEs, 
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an important conclusion is made that STEs are not homogeneous. The degree of 
competitiveness has a significant impact on outcomes as does the difference in the 
objectives of the agencies.  In conclusion, the review of the research results 
emphasised the need for further cautious empirical work that focuses on the actual 
impacts rather than just the theoretically potential impacts.  
Prior studies reveal that research findings are sensitive to the prior 
assumptions made. In regards to the matter of anti-competitive behaviour, it may be 
argued that the potential for such behaviour is sufficient justification to suspend 
operations of STEs or significantly reform operations as proposed by several 
classification systems previously investigated. On the other hand, one could assume 
that current trade law in the WTO will protect other countries from trade injury 
resulting from illegal use of STE.   
The most frequent proposition in the literature is to develop a ranking system 
to evaluate the distorting potential of the STEs. Trying to establish and agree upon a 
benchmark is a process that is very demanding and subject to dispute because of 
claimed self interest. Several of the classification procedures were mentioned earlier 
but as useful as they are, they are not a substitute for systematic empirical work that 
examines the true impacts of STEs, controlling for the multitude of other influences 
on trade. 
Countries trade because, in principle, it is welfare improving to do so. Some 
countries can, in the short run at least, affect the terms of trade by offering industry 
participants favourable condition or subsidies. New trade theory explains how some 
countries can help initially support certain industries that otherwise would not be 
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competitive in their infancy, but that can eventually become competitive as the 
sector expands or develops thereby no longer needing public supports funds 
(Krugman, 1990). 
Rose (2004) found interesting conclusions about the impact on trade for 
participating countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO). After detailed 
empirical investigation using the gravity model and 0ver 40 year of bilateral trade 
data, Rose concludes that the evidence casts considerable doubt on the WTO‟s role 
in the growth of bilateral trade (Rose, 2004). It is important to have similarly sound 
empirical evidence about institutions like STEs, rather than conventional wisdom, 
guiding the decisions regarding the policy choice. Like the landmark study on the 
WTO, there is need to empirically investigate the impact of STEs on trade.  
 23 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
THE THEORECTICAL MODEL 
3.1    Theory of International Trade 
 The study of international trade has focused on several important questions. 
The following questions are front and centre in the debate by trade theorists. Why 
do countries trade? What determines the pattern of specialization in production and 
trade? Is trade beneficial, and to whom? Does anyone lose? What is the impact of 
government intervention? What is the optimal trade policy or strategy?  How do 
current market structures affect trade? Numerous theoretical approaches have been 
developed and defined around these questions and tested empirically.  
Classical Theory argues that uninterrupted free trade is beneficial to all trade 
partners. If countries focus on specializing in the production and export of those 
things they can produce with a lower opportunity cost relative to other countries and 
import those things that they are relatively higher cost (their comparative 
advantage), both are made better off. These transactions promote efficiency by 
international specialization and division of labour on which wealth is created 
(Smith, 1937).  
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There are several models that explain the factors that lead two countries to 
trade. In the Ricardian model a country‟s decision to import or produce domestically 
is determined by technological differences which determine their comparative 
advantage in the production. In Heckscher-Ohlin (HO/HOS) models (and essentially 
specific factors models also) trade flows are a result of countries exploiting their 
endowment differences, which then also determines the direction and magnitude of 
trade flows. For example, a country with the relatively larger endowment of labour 
will produce those goods that demand more labour in production. 
In the new trade theory (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) the increasing-
returns model explains how countries export as a means of expanding the market so 
that they can exploit increasing returns at an industry level. The conclusion is that 
multinational corporations are responsible for most of the trade rather than the 
“country” itself. If the firm can realize increasing returns in a particular production 
operation, there is motivation to expand output. They can only do so if the market 
exists. However, if the domestic market is small or saturated, the firm must look to 
move their output to another country. As the cost of information transfer falls and 
the expansion of multinational firms into new countries advances, the effectiveness 
of quickly marshalling resources to service and supply new demands increases and 
firms quickly respond to development incentives across the globe.   
The new approach to trade also looks at the significance of other factors 
such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a form of international transaction that 
was ignored in the classical environment (Dunning, 1995). Instead of firms 
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physically shipping goods to a market, they will set up a facility right in the demand 
country so only monetary flows are observed.   
 The gravity model has been gaining in popularity as a model to study 
international trade. Although the empirical application has been standard for some 
time (since Tinbergen, 1962), the gravity model has more recently been refined to 
reveal its theoretical basis. The gravity model is a common methodology used to test 
hypotheses regarding the dynamic development of policy instruments, the type of 
questions addressed by this research. The gravity model can be considered as a 
condensed form general equilibrium analysis of supply and demand forces. It 
explains trade flows as a function of the relative sizes of the economies (demand 
characteristics – intermediate and final consumption), distance between markets 
(gravity effect), the presence and type of trade barriers, and other cultural and 
historical similarities and differences between markets (e.g. common language, 
colonies), the latter are known as the border effect. The approach borrows from 
physics where the „economy‟ represents the gravitational force that pulls the product 
into the market. The closer and more open and transparent the economies, the higher 
the bilateral trade flow.  
3.2    The Gravity Model 
The gravity model has its foundations as an instrument of analysis for 
regional economics. Researchers have been using the gravity model to predict 
movement of people, information, and commodities between cities, countries and 
even continents (Linnemann, 1966). In its usual application, the gravity model takes 
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into account at least the population size or GDP of two places and their intervening 
distance. The gravity model incorporates these two features that larger places attract 
people, ideas, and commodities more than smaller places, and that places closer 
together have a greater natural attraction for commerce. This model has proven 
reliable and has been found to have high explanatory power international trade 
models. 
In its simplest form, the gravity model can be represented as: 
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                                                                                          (3.1) 
The term Xijt is the flow from origin i to destination j at certain time t.  It is often 
described as the volumes of exchange called bilateral trade flow, 
( , )ijt ij jiX f x x ,                                                                                      (3.2) 
where xij is the flow from country i to j and vice versa for xji.  
Yi and Yj are the sizes of the relevant exchanging countries measured in GDP or 
population,  
( )i iY f GDP , and                                                                                        (3.3) 
( )j jY f GDP .                                                                                               (3.4) 
Yi and Yj are measures of economic mass or the ability to produce (Yi) and consume 
(Yj). The larger this ability, the larger the bilateral trade is predicted to be. 
In equation (3.1), Dij captures the “distance” between the locations. The 
economic significance is that distance is a proxy for transport costs, value of time in 
transit, coordination, logistics cost or search cost. Distance reflects the cost of doing 
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business in a distant country. These factors have an inverse relationship to trade 
flows. 
Rij in equation (3.1) measures the remoteness of a particular country in that it 
captures the amount of opportunity one country has to trade with another country.  
A country with a high Rij value will have few close neighbours. As such, they are 
more inclined to import more from a particular country they have established a 
relationship with because the search costs of locating a new trade partner becomes a 
deterrent. As a measure of Rij, variables to capture familiarity and similarities 
between countrys are included. 
Although the gravity model in simplistic form does a reasonable job 
explaining bilateral trade patterns by controlling for size and distance, it has been 
refined by adding additional variables of interest. For example it has been refined to 
test the influence of variables pertaining to current and past policies, geography, 
common history and institutional arrangement such as STE to name a few (Rose, 
2004). 
 The gravity model was first developed and used econometrically to describe 
trade flows by Jan Tinbergen (1962) even though the analysis and conclusions were 
strictly intuitive, rather than being theoretical grounded. Since then, the gravity 
model has been used extensively in the empirical trade literature. Despite its 
widespread use and repeated empirical validation, the theoretical basis of the gravity 
model has come into question since it tends to be derived from a physical 
geographical relationship rather than being based on differences in productivity, 
endowments or other traditional bases of international trade, as would be common 
 28 
 
of theoretical trade models. The search for a theoretical basis for the gravity model 
is motivated in part by the striking empirical success of the model. However, the 
gravity model can be used in numerous trade theory contexts including monopolistic 
competition in the new trade theory (Helpman and Krugman 1985; Helpman, 1987) 
and variations of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin- Samuelson (HO/HOS) model 
(Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1995). Subsequent research has developed further to 
define the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model, to complement its 
empirical success, thereby establishing the gravity model as a model of trade.  
Anderson (1979) pioneered a theoretical construct to the gravity model. 
Anderson‟s model provides an explanation for the gravity model as it applies to 
commodity flows. The model is derived from a system of expenditure functions 
describing one country‟s expenditure on another country‟s product, using the 
Armington assumption that products are differentiable by country of origin.  By 
assuming Cobb Douglas preferences, Anderson obtains a gravity model where 
imports of a particular commodity are a function of the share of income spent on 
imports and transit costs. In a very simple way, Anderson obtained a gravity model 
suitable for estimation and was able to link it to the theory through a convenient 
testable equation.  This model allowed for variations in preference thereby allowing 
flexibility in the expenditure share between countries by varying the type of 
expenditure function assumed. In particular, the case of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) was also assumed and the gravity model was derived (Anderson 
1979).  Anderson‟s outcome suggests that after controlling for economic size of a 
country, a country whose barriers to trade are relatively high to all trade countries 
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will require a very strong bilateral relationship with at least one country to 
experience benefits of trade.   
The gravity model is respected as a partial equilibrium model of export 
supply and import demand. The earlier derivations of the model were from a 
Marshallian demand system. Linnemann (1966) links the gravity model to a reduced 
form partial equilibrium system of equations of export supply and import demand 
that are driven by income and populations. Trade occurs because of the limited size 
of the origin country and the demand in the destination country (Linnemann 1966). 
Critics argue that the approach is weak and does not explain the multiplicative form 
because it uses too many variables for each partial equilibrium and cannot be 
reduced to the gravity model very easily. Further significant contributions were to 
extend the model so that world trade is attached to a probability distribution and 
interpreted as potential imports and exports (Leamer and Stern, 1970).  
Using a CES utility function adds greater flexibility as do other assumptions 
about export and import demand as previously mentioned. As a case in point, 
Bergstrand (1985) offers a version of the gravity model that allows for different 
elasticities of substitution between imports and goods produced at home. This 
relates to the classical theory that differences in preferences affect trade. 
Bergstrand‟s outcome shows the importance of pre-specification of preferences 
because imported goods may not be close substitutes for those produced 
domestically (Bergstrand, 1985). This provides insight into the importance of the 
home market effect and extends further Anderson‟s choice of using Armington 
assumptions which holds that goods produced in different localities are not 
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necessarily perfect substitutes. Deardorff (1995) simplifies the analysis and makes a 
clear link to the HO models under two extreme cases of market structure or degrees 
of friction in trade from perfect competition to monopolistic competition. However 
he flags caution because the universal empirical success of the gravity model in 
validating the multiple trade theories may require further investigation. 
There is a subsequent set of papers that deals with adding different variations 
to the gravity model in the context of New Trade Theory. This theoretical 
environment incorporates the concept of the firm level or industry level in 
international trade and how the gravity model is well suited to represent this 
perspective (Helpman & Krugman, 1985). The new trade theory focus allows for 
arguments such as economies of scale, particularly increasing return to scale (IRS) 
as additional explanation for why countries trade and why certain industries develop 
in some countries and not in others. 
 Bergstrand (1989) derives the gravity model by using the framework of 
monopolistic competition at the firm level. This removes the Armington assumption 
and allows for product differentiation among firms. This innovation was motivated 
by Krugman‟s (1985) insight on industry having internal economies that drive trade 
between countries as firms attempt to increase market share. This is particularly 
useful when considering the impact of a particular industry in an economy and the 
trade that occurs within an industry. In classical trade theory, the focus is on factor 
endowments and technology differences alone that causes trade between countries 
to occur. However, institutions affect the willingness to trade and have a direct 
impact on transaction costs. International competitiveness depends on other factors 
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like unobservable trade costs such a government policy. In the presence of 
unfavourable institutional arrangements like poor legal or governance systems the 
cost of exchange increases (de Groot et al. 2003). These factors and policy choices 
can also be accounted for in a gravity model specification and also incorporate 
marketing arrangements like the use of STEs. 
3.3    The Basic Theoretical Setup 
The Linnemann approach and further explanations by Leamer and Stern 
(1970) and Bergstrand (1985) of the gravity model as a system of excess demand 
and supply, provides a framework for representing flows of a single commodity 
among multiple countries in a gravity equation form. This research modifies the set 
of equations by Prentice et al (1998) who used a gravity model to look at trade flows 
of a single commodity between two countries.  
Equilibrium is obtained when: 
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If: 
X
iQ = the excess supply in country i for commodities consumed in country j; 
I
ijQ = the excess demand in country j for commodities produced in country i;  
E
ijQ = the market clearing quantity; 
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I
iP = commodity price in import country; 
X
iP = commodity price in export country; 
ijD = transaction costs of moving a commodity into country j from i; 
I
iS = factors affecting supply and demand in import country i; and 
X
iS = factors affecting supply and demand in export country i. 
 
Therefore the gravity model function can be represented in equilibrium by, 
 ( , , )Eijt ij it jtQ Q D S S                                                                                  (3.9) 
where trade flow of the commodity from country i to j in period t ( EijtQ ) are a 
function the physical distance separating i from j representing transaction costs (Fij)  
and a collection of supply and demand shifters in the export (Sit) and import (Sjt) 
countries such as income, population, STE etc.  
The reduced form of the equilibrium of excess supply and excess demand is 
represented as, 
  ,( , , )
E E I X
ij ij ij i iQ Q D S S                                                                            (3.10) 
In equilibrium (
E
ijQ ), consumption quantities are a function of transportation/ 
transaction costs (Dij) and factors that shift supply and demand in the export (
X
iS ) 
and import ( IiS ) countries.  
Using just income IitY and 
X
itY  as the supply and demand factors (as observed in 
3.1), the testable empirical specification of the gravity model is obtained by deriving 
equation (3.10) in its multiplicative form and taking the natural log of it the 
variables:  
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where Geogij (Rij in equation 3.1)is a matrix of factors capturing the context of 
country remoteness. This is the same outcome that one would obtain by taking the 
natural log of equation (3.1).  
 This simple gravity model can be expanded to include other influences on 
trade flows. McCallum (1995) shows the extent of the border effect, Rose (2004) 
capture the effect or lack of effect of the WTO and so on. Geographic distance is not 
the only barrier to trade and most of the literature includes other potential factors 
like language, tariffs, common history, etc. It is in the context of these additional 
explanatory variables that the impact of STEs can be tested. In addition to income, 
although it is a strong determinant of demand, variants like population can be added 
or substituted to achieve theoretical satisfaction. 
 The result is a equilibrium function of the gravity model that will look like 
( , , , )
ijt
EQ f Economic Geographic Culture History                                (3.12) 
where equilibrium trade flows are explained by a series of economic and non-
economic features from both trading partners that capture the ability to produce and 
consume. Factors that possibly promote trade like common cultural similarities and 
similar historical relationships, plus factors that inhibit such as remoteness, 
geographical difficulties and policy choices of which STEs are an example.  
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CHAPTER IV 
                                           EMPIRICAL MODEL 
4.1    Empirical Gravity Model Applications 
The hypothesised relationship between trade flows and state trading 
enterprises (STE), as well as other explanatory variables are commonly tested using 
a gravity model specification. The gravity model is most often been applied for 
aggregate trade. The model has been used to estimate the impact of national borders 
(MaCallum, 1995; Furtan and van Melle, 2004). MaCallum‟s (1995) study showed 
that the border was indeed important despite the trade agreements that are designed 
to mitigate its effect (McCallum, 1995). He found that there still exists a significant 
home market bias in Canada. It has been shown that the composition of goods can 
significantly affect the results in the context of border effects matters (Hillberry, 
2002). Once controlling for the traditional gravity features and eliminating 
aggregation bias, Hillberry (2002) demonstrated that the border effects are 
somewhat reduced from McCallums (1995) results. This lends support for strong 
results from a gravity model that would be disaggregated by commodity. 
 Furtan and van Melle (2004) tested for the border effect on a group of 
agricultural products traded between Canada and the U.S. and found significant 
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border restriction despite regional trade agreements like CUSTA. The gravity model 
has also been used to examine the relationship between economic growth and 
increases in trading activity with the result that trade was found to have a significant 
positive impact on regional income growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999). The gravity 
models have been used to test for the home market affect within OECD countries; 
even with many regional trade agreement controls a home bias effect was present 
though it was found to be decreasing in the period from 1982-1994 (Wei, 1996 ). 
A commonly held understanding in the trade literature is that barriers to 
trade such as tariffs are welfare reducing. From this preposition one should believe 
that membership in a trade agreement whose goal is reduction and elimination of 
such barriers would promote trade. Rose (2004) uses the gravity model to test 
whether being a member of the WTO, and its precursor the GATT, has a beneficial 
effect by increasing trade between member countries. There were no comprehensive 
empirical models testing the beneficial assumption prior to his study. The results 
cast doubt on the significance of membership in the WTO on trade flows and that 
there is little evidence to suggest that the pattern of trade is different when a country 
joins or is a member of WTO (Rose, 2004). Rose points out that there may be other 
reasons that a country would wish to be a part of this organization. These could 
range from security to dispute settlement mechanisms. 
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Following Rose, it is important to note that by empirically including country 
specific fixed effects
2
, the gravity model the results show benefits to being a part of 
the WTO in terms of increased bilateral trade flows, but unevenly (Subramanian and 
Wei, 2003).  The fixed effect component is an important econometric specification 
in large samples. The fixed effect absorbs the idiosyncratic error component specific 
to a particular importer, exporter or trade pair. By including the fixed effect the 
model will likely suffer less from omitted variables as the fixed effect will include 
all the invariant omitted variables. This underlines the importance of sound 
econometric specification and correctly interpreting the situation that is being 
studied. The Subramanian and Wei study creates variables for WTO membership 
based on developed versus developing countries. By including this differentiation, 
the effect of WTO membership is observed to be positive and significant in 
developed countries and but insignificant in developing countries    
In comparison to the results estimated by Rose, the country fixed effect 
results suggest that some countries that became members over the period included in 
the study have experienced increases in trade. The results from Rose show the 
overall impact of all countries during the study period to be insignificant. This result 
relies on the assumption that countries received the same impact as a member of the 
WTO irrespective of when they might have joined, which is somewhat 
misrepresentative. 
                                                 
 
2
 The construction of the fixed effect variables was a dummy variable for when country i exporter 
and a dummy for when country j was an importer. 
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The study by Rose focuses on the impact of institutions like the WTO on 
trade flows. These institutions can be trade facilitators or barriers. The gravity 
model also has been extended to test the impacts of institutional characteristics on 
trade such as political stability, the quality of governance and the similarities 
between regulatory structures (de Groot et al., 2003). This model tested trade value 
between approximately 100 countries in 1998 use the standard gravity model 
variables plus six institutional proxies for governance ranging from accountability, 
rule of law and control of corruption. As hypothesised, the more open, accountable 
and less corrupt the economy is, the higher is the bilateral trade.  In sum, these 
extensions were an attempt to further analyse transaction costs, finding that the 
presence of strong institutions, higher bilateral trade is evident.  
These applications support the ability of the gravity model to capture the 
impact of institutions and marketing systems like STEs. With proper model 
specification and incorporating the STE used in the international wheat market, the 
gravity model can provide useful results. 
4.2    Commodity Specific Gravity Model 
While gravity models have most often been applied to aggregate bilateral 
trade, several studies have used the gravity model to study commodity specific trade 
flows. A gravity model was used to analyse the Canadian pork exports to the U.S. to 
derive an interregional commodity specific trade model (Prentice et al. 1998). This 
analysis is done in a one commodity multi country world, searching for potential 
U.S. markets for Canadian pork. The gravity model was used to represent the 
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derived demand for transportation as a result of the export potential of the specific 
commodity. Prentice found that Canadian pork is a normal good in the U.S. and that 
Canadian exports are significantly impacted by U.S. pork production. Their results 
offer the most promising U.S. import locations for Canadian pork from the 5 
different production regions.  
 The gravity model has also been used to explore the determinants of trade 
for specific products defined at the 8-10 digit SITC-level in a Tobit specification 
with fixed effects (Aguilar, 2006). Specifically, Aguilar determined which countries 
had the greatest export potential of frozen tart cherries (FTC) to a particular country 
based on historical differences from the mean trade in FTC. Their findings are quite 
specific to each country in the study based on the specification required. They 
conclude that FTCs are normal goods and one of key factors of export potential 
would be if the importer had previously purchased from the exporter. 
 The gravity model has also been used to study the impact of trade 
promoting policies for the world wheat market (Koo & Karemera, 1991). Although 
fixed effects were most appropriate, Koo and Karemera considered both fixed 
effects and random effects
3
 models to estimate wheat trade volumes from nine 
exporters to 34 importers from 1981 to 1987. Their study found that long term 
agreements and credit sales were most distortionary to the international wheat trade. 
Interestingly, the use of the Export Enhancement Program was found to be a less 
                                                 
 
3
 Random Effects – The random effects is a estimation where the unobserved effects is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables at each time.  
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effective trade enhancement policy.  It was found that protectionist policies like the 
level of domestic price support by importers tend to inhibit wheat trade.  
In the case of analysing the impact of a STE, the gravity model offers a 
means of capturing the effects of market conditions namely supply and demand, in 
addition to specific institutional arrangements and policy choices.  The research 
outlined above demonstrates the utility of the gravity model approach for the 
objective set in this research. 
4.3    Model Specification 
The gravity model used in this study will include the theoretical gravity 
components, a number of additional variables to add to the explanatory power of the 
model, and variables to test our hypothesis surrounding the use of STEs. In using 
the gravity model for the study of a particular commodity, several adjustments are 
required. Most gravity models look at the total value or volume of trade that occurs 
between trade pairs. This is acceptable if direction is not important for the 
hypothesis variables. However, in the model required for the current research, a 
country can be an importer and/or an exporter with a STE managing either/both 
sides of the transactions. This requires the model to keep the economic explanatory 
variables separate. Although the fundamental characteristics of the gravity model 
are the same, some differences are introduced in attempt to have a specification that 
is more tailored to represent a particular commodity or classification of goods, 
rather than the economy as a whole. Consistent with the traditional gravity model, 
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the economic explanatory variables are expressed as natural logs. The gravity model 
specification for this analysis is the following: 
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  (4.1) 
where i is the exporting country and j is the importing country of the trade 
transaction and t is the time period. The other variables are:   
- Xij denotes the export value (volume) of wheat exports from country i to j at 
time t; 
- agYi is the value of agriculture GDP in the export country; 
- Yj is real GDP in the import country; 
- landl is a binary which is unity if a country is landlocked; 
- island is a binary which is unity if a country is an island; 
- dist is the distance in km between i and j; 
- border is a binary which is unity if i and j share a land border; 
- comlang is a binary which is unity if i and j have a common language; 
- comcol is a binary which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 
with the same colonizer; 
- colony is a binary which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa; 
- curcol is a binary which is unity if i is a colony of j at time t or vice versa; 
- fta is a binary variable which is unity if i and j both belong to the same 
regional trade agreement; 
- wto is a binary which is unity if both i and j are GATT/WTO members at t; 
- cu is a binary which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t; 
- STEx is a binary which is unity if the country has a State trading exporter; 
- STExM is a binary which is unity if the country‟s STE exporter is a 
monopoly; 
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- STEi is a binary which is unity if the country has a State trading importer; 
- STEiM is a binary which is unity if the country‟s STE importer is a 
monopoly; 
- Tt is a set of year dummies; and 
- ijt   is the stochastic error. 
 
The terms in equation (4.1) are more thoroughly defined, described and sourced in 
appendix Table A1.1. 
 Recall that the gravity model is a reduced form model for simultaneously 
analyzing supply and demand. The regression analysis variables can be categorized 
into four groupings to capture the characteristic of supply, demand, geographical 
constraints and trade facilitation factors.  
 This model uses the exporting country‟s value of agriculture (agYi) in their 
national accounts to capture the ability of the country to produce agriculture 
products. This is a proxy for the export country‟s supply of wheat. This is consistent 
with Koo and Karemera (1991) who found that agriculture sector income is the 
correct specification for export capacity. Gravity models estimating aggregate (all 
commodities) trade flows commonly use the export country's GDP as a proxy for 
productive capacity. This would be an inappropriate specification for single 
commodity analysis. The agriculture (agYi) variable is expected have a positive 
influence on the value of wheat exports. Consistent with theory, the importing 
country‟s GDP in constant dollars (Yj) is included to reflect the purchasing power 
and thus the demand for wheat in the importing country. Assuming wheat is a 
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normal good, the greater the GDP in the importing country the greater the demand 
for wheat is expected to be, and thus the greater the value of imports.   
 Distance (distij) is included as a proxy for transportation cost and is expected 
to exhibit a negative relationship. It is important to note that for trade in bulk 
commodities like wheat we would expect transportation costs to exert a significant 
influence as they are typically a non trivial proportion of the total cost of the 
product.  However, given the high fixed costs of transporting a bulk commodity 
such as port and loading costs, there could be a non linear relationship between 
trade value and transportation cost. A further consideration is the relationship 
between the exporter and importer‟s agronomic conditions. Nearby countries may 
experience very similarly conducive conditions for producing wheat and may not be 
likely trading partners. More distant countries may be less likely to produce the 
same commodities and thus be more likely to be trading partners. This expected net 
effect of distance is ambiguous. Koo and Karemera (1991) found distance to be 
insignificant and argue that it was because of non-homothetic preferences in the 
import country that can also influence the ambiguity.  
Other variables that describe if the country is landlocked (landl) or an island 
(island) are included to capture other logistical and transportation constraints or 
advantages.  If a country is landlocked it requires service by railroad or by large 
truck to move wheat into the consumption area or out of the production country. 
This is relatively expensive for low value commodities. This would be reflected as 
lower return to the exporting country which in turn would lower the value of their 
exports because of the higher price need to compensate the cost of transportation.  
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However, some countries have or have had programs that cover some of the cost 
incurred because of the natural disadvantages.  
 The fact that a country is an island has interesting consequences. Typically 
the islands are small and heavily dependent on imports. If this characterization of 
the import island is true we would expect this to have a positive impact on the value 
of imports. However, many of the island countries in our sample are yet developing 
and lack the infrastructure to receive large bulk shipments by ocean freight. This 
then likely lowers the value of exports to the country. If the export country is an 
island this lowers the cost of any geographic barriers because transporting bulk 
product by water has a lower cost and would likely be reflected as a positive 
influence on the value of exports from that country. The result is an ambiguous 
expectation. These variables are included to capture transportation and other logistic 
cost where the typical transportation proxy of distance by itself is ambiguous. 
 A variable is included to note if the trade pair shares a common border 
(borderij). The border affect is most interesting in interregional trade analysis with 
trade occurring between regions within a country and also between country pairs. 
When the importing country share the border with the exporting country it is 
reasonable to think that the import country would find it more convenient and less 
costly to procure wheat supplies than in the absence of a common border.  
 Whether or not the trading countries share a common language (comlangij) is 
controlled for. This is important because being able to communicate in a common 
language eases the transaction. Thus, it is expected that having a common language 
is will have a positive effect. Also included are variables describing past and current 
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colonial relationships (comcolij, colonyij, curcolij). These are included to reflect the 
benefits some parent countries extend to the colonies, which may extend even after 
the nation becomes independent from the colonizing country. Two countries that 
share the same colonizing nation may also experience a common bond that may 
help facilitate trade.  However, these historical colonial relationships can also 
potentially capture some post colonial animosity; thus resulting in a negative effect. 
There is no clear a priori expectation with regard to the colonial effects.  
 This model includes information about whether or not the country pair 
shares a regional trade agreement. The selected regional trade agreements (ftaij) are 
used to capture the advantageous elements that helps facilitate and promote trade 
between countries as specified in the objective of the agreement. The agreements 
controlled for are European Union/ European Community (EU/EC), Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), Central American Common Market (CACM), 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur), and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Table 4.1 
briefly outlines the number of countries and the year in which the agreements were 
found. Not all the members in 2005 were necessarily founding members but 
overtime the countries have joined. In some circumstances, a country may only be 
an associate member resulting in only selected benefits from the trade agreement. 
Also in the case of CACM, the trade agreement was operationally ineffective from 
1969 to 1991, but has since been revived.  Membership in a regional trade 
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agreement is expected to have a positive impact on trade between member 
countries. 
Table 4.1: Regional Trade Agreement Information Table 
Regional Trade 
Agreement 
# of Member Countries in 2005 Year of Foundation 
EU/EC 25 1957 
CARICOM 20 *(5 of these assoc. members) 1973 
CACM 5 1960* (‟69 to 91‟) 
ASEAN 13 1967 
SPARTECA 15 1980 
Mercosur 10 *(5 of these assoc. members) 1991 
NAFTA 3 1994 
Source: Specific Agreements Website 
 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) facilitates the development and 
enforcement of international rules of trade. The objective of the organization is to 
improve the welfare of its membership through the lowering of barriers to trade. 
This is the only large scale multilateral international organization that deals with 
trade rules between all countries. The WTO provides a venue for universal 
commitment by member countries to follow the agreed rules in a transparent way, 
without discrimination, with reciprocity while ensuring domestic security. Being a 
member of the WTO captures the legal commitment to which countries are bound 
by with respect to offering domestic support or protection to their industries. Prior to 
the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the only 
multilateral agreement for international trade and it was in the GATT where the 
regulatory article on the use of STE was first negotiated.  Being a member of the 
WTO/GATT (wtoij) is expected to have a positive impact on trade between member 
countries. 
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 A currency union (cuij) is when countries share a common currency. Most 
often it is argued that a sharing a common currency facilitates international trade by 
reducing exchange rate risk and fiscal policy shocks (Mundell, R. 1961). As a result, 
the fact that two countries have the same currency is believed to have a positive 
impact on the value of wheat trade.  
 Finally, the hypotheses variables in this study are the presence and status of 
STEs. This model uses a combination of binary variables to control for STEs. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, there are many concerns outlined in the literature with 
regard to the use of STEs. These range from trade distortion effects to non 
competitive domestic industries to obstructionist objectives of the STE. However, in 
the absence of a legislative article granting monopoly status to a STE, it is assumed 
that the STE would have to act like any other competitive firm.  Thus, the primary 
distinction is that, whether it is a monopolist because of exclusive privileges.  
 The STE variables are constructed in two parts. First a binary variable used 
to indicate if the country has a STE exporter (STEx). Secondly, an additional 
variable is used to indicate if that STE exporter is granted monopoly status 
(STExM). Also, the variables capturing the effect of an import STE is designed in a 
similar fashion. First, if the country has a STE importer (STEi) the dummy variable 
takes a value of one and if that STE is granted monopoly status (STEiM), the 
additional dummy variable takes a value of one.  
The presence of a STE may exist as a trade facilitation policy for either or 
both the exporter an importer. However, these agencies have been suspected as an 
instrument to gain an unfair advantage for exports or as protectionist policy by 
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importers as hypothesized in the beginning.  It is expected that the import STE with 
monopoly status will have a negative impact and that the monopoly status exporter 
would be positive.  
4.4    Data 
The dependant variable, both trade value and volume of wheat exports from 
one country to another, are from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (UN Comtrade, 2006). Specifically, the product is wheat except durum 
wheat, and meslin, unmilled (SITC Rev.1- 0410). These data show bilateral wheat 
trade between 180 countries for the past 35 year from 1970 to 2005. The values are 
converted from current US dollars to constant (1990) U.S. dollars using the deflator 
from the UN National Accounts database.  The observations are records that the 
reporting country (export country) provides of their exports to each partner country 
(import country). Only the exports are chosen to avoid double accounting of using 
both imports and exports since the imports into a country are already recorded as the 
export to that country. In this dataset there are countries that are both exporters and 
importers of wheat. In some years a country may have a surplus inventory and is 
then in an export position. This initially resulted in 21,453 wheat trade observations 
over the 35 years. Further cleaning of the data was required and below is the list 
information of these observations eliminated form the data set:    
- Trade Volume observations < 1 MT (1000 KG); 
- Trade Value observations ≤ 0; 
- Constant dollar unit price range of 20 < Con$/MT <1500; 
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- Observations where reporting country was the same as partner 
country; 
- Regional Aggregations (i.e. European Union, Americas, Custom 
Unions, Free Zones); and 
- Several small countries without independent variable observations 
(approx. < 1% of the trade over the past 35 years). 
Once accounting for these deletions there are 19,691 dependant variable 
observations.  
Information for the explanatory variables is then joined to this core wheat 
trade data. This was done by using Microsoft‟s Excel, Access and Sequel Server 
programs. Data for the variables GDP and agriculture GDP are obtained from the 
UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database and are recorded in constant 
(1990) US dollars. The geographical and colonial variables landl, island, dist, 
border, comlang, comcol, colony, and curcol are obtained from Andrew Rose‟s 
Dataset (Rose, 2006) and updates were obtained from the CIA World Factbook 
(CIA, 2006). Missing distance information is obtained from distance between 
capital cities and is recorded in kilometers (Geobytes, 2006) 
The information on the presence of a regional trade agreement, WTO 
membership and the currency union membership are from Andrew Rose‟s Dataset. 
Often once a country is part of an agreement they will always be a member. 
However, this is not always the case. Updates on membership are obtained from the 
trade agreements websites and from the WTO websites.  
The original data contribution is the information on STE. Table (4.2) 
outlines the countries in this study that use STE importer and/or exporters. This 
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information has been put together after extensively analyzing the literature and from 
WTO notification of STE forms. The information on STE importers was obtained 
from McCorriston and McLaren (2001) book on the use of STE in Agriculture and 
from Abbott and Young (1999) paper on STE importers where they had collected 
information on the countries that use a STE importer. As part of the WTO 
regulation on STEs, member countries must notify the WTO on the use of their 
STE. Much of the information obtained from previous research was checked against 
the WTO notification archives (Standford, 2006). To determine if the STE has 
monopoly status was obtained in the same way. The notification documentation 
used by member countries is in the appendix on page 96.  The bulk of the 
information on STE exporters was obtained from McCorriston and McLaren (2001) 
and notification documentation at the WTO (WTO, 2006).  
Table 4.2: Changes regarding the Use of  Wheat STEs from 1970 to 2005 
 
STE 
Exporter  
Export 
Monopoly  
STE 
Importer  
Import 
Monopoly  
# of STE in 1970  14  9  67  44  
started  2  ---  2  1  
quit  5  2  35  22  
Status Change  ---   -1  ---   -6  
# of STE in 2005 11  6  34  16  
# of obs. out of 
19,691  
37.34 % 
(7,352)  
17.47 % 
(3,441)  
35.62 % 
(7,015)  
26.08 % 
(5,136)  
% of Value  67.94 %  27.01 %  51.33 %  41.25 %  
% of Volume  67.41 %  27.60 %  54.53 %  46.05 %  
 
A full description of the variables, their sources, mean and standard deviations are 
included in Appendix Table A1.1.  
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4.5    Estimation Techniques 
4.5.1   Panel Data 
 Data is commonly studied on a single dimension of either cross sectional 
data (a set of variables describing a population at a particular time) or time series (a 
set of variables describing a population over time).  However, if appropriate, data 
can be merged to create a panel data set that captures the affect of changes in cross 
sectional attributes over time (Wooldridge, 2000). This can especially strengthen the 
analysis of a policy choice, like the impact of STEs over time.  
Panel data has appealing features in econometric analysis. One can control 
the immeasurable uniqueness of individual cross sectional units. This is important 
because it isolates cross sectional heterogeneity that is not observed in single 
dimension data analysis that would have caused perfect collinearity. Panel data 
captures more variability within variables, and reduces multicollinearity problems. 
Simultaneously, panel data can analyze the effects of time variant factors like 
agriculture productivity and cross sectional features like the use of STE to provide 
strong empirical results (Wooldridge, 2000; Kennedy, 2003). 
  
4.5.2   Unbalanced Panel Data 
 In most panel analysis the data is a balanced panel. This means that at each 
time period the same cross sectional units are observed. However, the nature of the 
dependent variable in this study is such that a trade between the same country pair is 
not always observed at each time interval. This may be because the transaction has 
 51 
 
gone unreported or that it has not occurred. Only the observations for which non-
zero trades were observed are included. The result of this is an unbalanced panel 
with different number of observations for each year.  It is important to understand 
why the panel is unbalanced. If the reason the cross sectional unit is unobserved is 
correlated with the idiosyncratic error there is a problem of attrition which can bias 
the estimates (Wooldridge, 2000).  
The reason no trade occurs in a particular year is likely a result of either 
excess supply in the import country or lack of exports from the export country. The 
particular reason for this could be a result of numerous causes from production 
factors to labour strike at a shipping point. However, these incidents would be 
particular to that specific period or time and once controlling for the uniqueness of 
each period with time dummies. It is anticipated that the reason trade between a 
particular trading pair in a certain year is not correlated with those unobserved 
factors that change over time in the period fixed effects. There is no reason to 
suspect attrition bias in the coefficient estimates from the unbalanced panel dataset.  
4.5.3   Panel Data Estimation 
 There are numerous means of obtaining estimates for panel data. Each 
method of estimation is a variation to the traditional estimating technique Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). They have been developed to deal with an array of statistical 
issues. The analysis of panel data can be more problematic than pure cross sectional 
because observations are usually not independent when analyzed over time. There 
are several reasons for violation of the standard OLS assumptions. First there is a 
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chance of serial correlation, where the errors can be correlated from one time period 
to the next. For example, countries often trade with the some of the same countries 
overtime. There is likely some unexplained relationship remaining from one period 
to the next.  Incorporating two way fixed effects helps to reduce this problem. 
Second is the problem of heteroskedasticity, where the error could have different 
variances across different cross sectional units. There could be greater variance in 
the error because some observation will reflect a greater range wheat demand for 
greater income spreads.  Also errors can also be correlated across units because of 
exogenous macro effects that affect all units. This is known as contemporaneous 
correlation of errors or spatial autocorrelation. Finally, there could be a joint 
problem of errors that are non-spherical meaning that the model suffers from both 
heteroskedastic and auto correlated errors at the same time (Wooldridge, 2002). The 
following sections describe the estimation methodologies used in this study.  
 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) 
 The POLS estimate is traditional OLS procedure on the panel data set. The 
model in equation (4.2) represents the POLS model. 
it it ity x v                                                                                (4.2) 
Where i denotes the particular country, firm or transaction relationship and t 
indentifies the time period.  Equation (4.3) depicts the composite error term as vit . 
The composite error can be described in the following manner,  
it i itv a u                                                                                       (4.3) 
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where ai are all those unobserved time invariant factors and uit is the idiosyncratic 
error that represents the unobserved factors that affect the dependent variable and 
are time variant. If the model is completely specified, heterogeneity bias from 
omitted time constant variables is not an issue and one can assume ai=0 
(Wooldridge,  2002). In this research it is difficult to control for some feature like 
land characteristics that are constant over time but are an important component of 
production. The fixed effects can account for such things like the temperate and 
arable land availability. In large panel data sets there is likely much unidentified 
noise in the error that is due to some particular event or shock that was specific to 
that time period are even trade relationship. For this intuitive rational, this is an 
unrealistic assumption. For this reason, it is most likely to require some correction 
to these significant effects and for this the fixed effects addition is included.  
 
Fixed Effects (FE) 
The fixed effects model allows for estimation in the presence of unobserved 
effects that are common with panel data. Specifically, this estimator is used to 
control the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. One straight forward technique to 
account for the fixed effect is to use dummy variable for each panel. However, this 
will remove one degree of freedom for each country trade pair. Another technique to 
remove the constant fixed effect from the process is to take differences each 
observation from its unit specific mean. By applying the fixed effects transformation 
to equation (4.4) one derives  
1( ) ( ) ( )it i it i it iy y x x u u                                                             (4.4) 
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This removes the time invariant ai from equation (4.3). The fixed effect estimation 
is robust with an unbalanced panel (Wooldridge, 2000). 
4.5.4   Estimator Selection and Econometric Diagnostics  
There are several empirical considerations in assembling and using panel 
data. One concern in this model is the high risk of endogeneity. Researchers have 
taken two general approaches to this problem. The first and most simple way is to 
accept its presence and interpret the results with caution. The second way is to deal 
with it through an array of statistical techniques. The source of endogeneity in this 
model is a result of reverse causality. In brief, this describes a situation where the 
dependent variable may be driving or create the causal effect for the independent 
variable. In this model it is conceivable that STEs can be created because they are 
responding to high/low trade flow patterns. The historical discussion surrounding 
the reason countries started using STEs explain their presence as a result of a war 
time policy, domestic stabilization and not necessarily because of existing low 
exports or high imports. As a result endogeneity is not considered a critical problem 
because the stated rationale for the creation and use of STEs. In the fixed effects 
model, it is even less likely because these motivations are capture in the fixed 
effects. Further descriptive evidence appears later in the result section based on the 
coefficient estimates.   
There are numerous hypothesis tests to determine the appropriate estimation 
technique. There are several techniques in estimating panel data. Some are the 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and between effects. As earlier mention, 
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the FE estimation is most appropriate when one cannot distinguish between 
observed versus unobserved heterogeneity.  The fixed effects model can be used to 
control for unmeasured or unobservable heterogeneity. The F test gives insight with 
regard to using the POLS over the fixed effects and in essence tests for the presence 
of a fixed effect within the data. The F test is a way of determining whether the 
POLS estimates (βPOLS) are equal to the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects 
(βFE). Failure to accept the null suggests that the fixed effect specification is the 
most appropriate (Baltagi, 2001; Edgerton, 2004). This means that one cannot 
assume that coefficient estimates over one group are equal to those estimates over 
another group.  
 If the F test suggests the presence of a fixed effect, there is a test to 
determine if the random effect estimator is more appropriate than the fixed effect. 
The Hausman test is an acceptable procedure to test this hypothesis. The essence of 
this test is to determine if the coefficient estimates are systematic or not. If the error 
component ai is safely assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variable, the 
uses of random effects are the most appropriate.  If not, then the fixed effects are 
used to eliminate the time invariant error component. 
When the variance of the error term is not constant there is 
heteroskedasticity. To test for heteroskedasticity in panel data, a likelihood ration 
test is used to compare generalized least squares (GLS) output from a restricted 
model specified to have heteroskedasticity with the unrestricted model. In gravity 
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models there is a robust
4
 command and the cluster
5
 command which specifies that 
the observations are independent across country pairs but not necessarily 
independent within groups. These correction are  used to produce robust standard 
errors.   
 In econometric analysis it is important to analyse the behaviour of the 
residuals. Correlation in the error can come from both components of the error term 
described in equation (4.3). Wooldridge (2002) outlines a procedure for testing for 
serial correlation for panel data. The test is a regression of the residuals on the 
explanatory variables and the lag of the residuals to see if there is an inter-temporal 
relationship within the error term. In gravity models, the correction for serial 
correlation occurs by obtaining robust standard errors.   
Another testing procedure for autocorrelation is somewhat different because 
of the time demeaned data. This test requires residual analysis to test to see if there 
is a relationship between the errors from on period to the next (Wooldridge,  2002). 
The correction for serial correlation in the fixed effect model that fits the panel 
regression model when the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive is the 
xtregar estimator in Stata. This estimator provides a specific correction to error uit 
from equation (4.4). 
  * , 1it i itu u t z                                                                            (4.4) 
                                                 
 
4
 Robust – The robust option is used to estimating the standard errors using the Huber-White 
Sandwich Estimators. 
5
 Cluster – The cluster option is used to indicate that the observations are clustered into regions 
(based on country pairs) and that the observations may be correlated within districts, but would be 
independent between districts. 
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where ρ is less than 1 and zit is independent and identically distributed (iid) with zero 
mean zero and variance σz
2
.  
 The models were estimated using Stata with corrections to deal with the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The model was first estimated 
using Pooled OLS. Testing this model revealed that the country pair specific effect 
was important. These results provide a useful benchmark for comparing the general 
effect to the fixed effects correction as the results are not biased but may not be 
minimum variance. The tests indicated that the random effects correction was not 
the correct specification for the individual trade pair effect.  
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CHAPTER V 
 RESULTS 
In this chapter selected results of the gravity model estimations are 
presented. The chapter begins with a brief description of the pooled OLS 
specification, followed by the preferred fixed effects model. Sub samples results are 
presented to test the robustness of the main finding to specific examples. As a 
preview of the main findings, the significant impacts from STE exporters in the 
international wheat trade are not a result of having monopoly status. STE importers 
have no significant effect on the value of trade regardless of having monopoly status 
or not. 
5.1    Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Results  
The Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) results are presented in some 
detail below for comparative purposes even though the specification is subsequently 
refined to incorporate the fixed effects. Traditionally, POLS has been the common 
specification for many of the assessments of trade relationships using the gravity 
model. The results here are discussed in this context. 
The POLS models were estimated using Stata and were corrected for serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity using cluster and robust corrections (Farid 
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Toubal, 2006).  The previous chapter outlined the test used to detect the problems of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Test for their presence indicated the presence 
of both. 
The test for heteroskedasticity uses the likelihood ratio tests and indicates 
there to be a problem. Since the LR χ2 test statistic is -7646.2, there is no confidence 
level at which the unrestricted model without heteroskedasticity is acceptable, thus 
we conclude that the presence of heteroskedasticity exists. This is the basis for 
incorporating the correction for heteroskedasticity. 
A procedure for testing for serial correlation for a panel dataset was 
developed by Wooldridge (2002). 
Ho:  No 1
st
 Order Autocorrelation  
Ha:  1
st
 Order Autocorrelation 
  
Reject H0 if  FCalculated >FCritical  
 
Since FCalculated =150.37, FCritical = 3.84 and the probability that FCritical  is greater 
than FCalculated  is zero, we fail to accept the null hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation in the error. Estimating a regression of the residuals on the explanatory 
variables and the lag of the residuals also suggests significant serial correlation. In 
this case the test is a basic t-test to examine if the coefficient on the lagged residual 
is zero. The result was a coefficient estimate of 0.7065 and t statistic of 126.99 
indicating positive serial correlation. Thus, the model estimates are corrected for 
serial correlation.  
 The full results of the POLS are outlined in Table 5.1. Columns 1and 4 are a 
list of the explanatory variables used in the regression equation (4.1). The results 
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from estimating the equation using OLS are reported in columns 2 and 5 and 
parallel to the POLS estimates are the fixed effects results in columns 3 and 6. In 
general, the model produces results that for the most part are consistent with the 
expected relationships. There are two variables, distance and WTO membership, 
where the results are unexpected. In Table 5.1 the coefficients for each variable are 
shown with the t-statistics provided in parenthesis below the coefficient. The 
coefficient estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% or greater 
significance level are shown in bold.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 : Empirical Results for Estimated Determinants of  Real 
Value of Wheat Trade between Country Pairs, 1970 - 
2005 
 1 
Variable  
2 
Pooled-OLS 
Model 
3 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
4  
Variable 
List, contd 
5 
Pooled-OLS 
Model, contd 
6 
Fixed Effects 
Model, contd 
agY
i
 
0.346  
(9.920)  
0.059  
(2.17)  ftaij
 
 
1.663  
(7.790)  
0.797  
(5.96)  
Y
j 
 
0.102  
(3.050)  
-0.075  
(-1.67)  wtoij
 
 
-0.453  
(-4.300)  
0.22  
(1.86)  
dist 
0.311  
(4.230)  
d  
 cuij
 
 
-0.186  
(-0.470)  
d  
  
landli  
-0.432  
(-2.020)  
d 
  STEx  
1.739  
(10.220)  
0.649  
(3.17)  
landlj  
-0.806  
(-4.790)  
d 
  STExM  
-0.133  
(-0.660)  
-0.444  
(-1.26)  
islandi  
-0.502  
(-1.670)  
d 
  STEi  
0.084  
(0.530)  
-0.064  
(-0.37)  
islandj  
-0.931  
(-3.730)  
d 
  STEiM  
0.996  
(6.040)  
0.059  
(0.31)  
border  
0.537  
(2.230)  
d 
  cons 
0.623  
(0.490)  
2.5767  
(42.36)  
comcol  
-0.106  
(-0.520)  
d 
  N 19,691  16,792  
comlang  
-0.042  
(-0.270)  
d 
  Adj Rsq  0.242  
 
colony  
0.849  
(2.780)  
d 
  Within Rsq  
 
0.328  
curcol  
-0.557  
(-0.580)  
d 
 
 Source: Author‟s Estimates 
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Table 5.1 provides the coefficient estimates of each variable for the POLS 
model. Following is a brief synopsis of those results.  As expected, the coefficient 
on agriculture value-added (agYi) in the exporting country was positive and 
significant. This indicates that as the productive capacity of the agriculture industry 
rises, so does the value of wheat exports from that country.  This is an expected 
result, as the productivity and the ability of a county to produce increases so to do 
there exports. It is, of course, the case that the value added component of agriculture 
in some countries will not include any wheat exports. However, as a broad proxy for 
the ability to produce wheat, the variable has the expected sign and is strongly 
significant.  Also, the GDP proxy for demand (Yj) in the importing country is 
positive and significant. This indicates that the levels of exports into that country 
rise as the importing country‟s GDP increases. This indicates that wheat is a normal 
good.   
 The estimated coefficients suggest that distance (dist) is positive and 
significant. In most gravity models distance exerts a negative influence, though 
there are other circumstance where the negative result for distance would be a 
surprising result (Melitz, J, 2006). One potential explanation for the positive and 
significant effect would be that countries close together might experience a more 
similar climatic seasonal weather pattern or agronomic growing conditions. Thus, in 
the event of a drought on one side of the world the farther you are away the more 
need you have for trade. Countries close to one another are more likely to grow the 
same crops because of the similar growing conditions. Because of this, they are 
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more likely to trade with more distant countries that are agronomically different. 
These factors can thereby result in a positive coefficient on distance. 
 It would appear that geographical features that describe a country are of 
importance to the value of exports between two countries. If either the exporter or 
the importer is a landlocked (landli or j) country the results indicate that this 
represents an additional geographical barrier to overcome, namely moving imports 
or exports across land from ocean sea port. This barrier adds cost to the acquiring 
the product thereby reducing the value of the export countries product.  These 
coefficients of the landlocked variables capture an important influence and are both 
negative and significant. If the export country is an island (islandi) and if, the export 
country is exporting to an island (islandj) the impact on the value of their exports is 
negative.  
 If a country is exporting to a country with which it shares a border (border), 
the impact on the value of exports is positive. There are a couple of effects being 
captured here. First, there are some relatively small amounts of wheat being moved 
between traditionally wheat exporting countries. This is most likely capturing trade 
in some specific quality characteristic that is being sought for blending purposes. 
Also, there are some countries that share a border and the importing country is quite 
small or a net importer. They are most likely to trade with a close country because 
this would be their least cost alternative. In general, sharing a border would reduce 
transportation and transaction cost, thus facilitating trade. 
 When the trading pair shares a common language (comlang) the impact is 
insignificant. Sharing a common language does not have a significant effect on 
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wheat trade between countries. This is also true for many of the other colonial 
variables used to capture any common historical history or experience attributes. 
The only colonial variable that is significant is if the export country was ever a 
colony (colony) of the import country or vice versa.  This coefficient is positive and 
significant indicating that these historical connections do matter and do have 
positive influence on wheat trade. In particular, France exports a lot to past colonies 
as does England. Additionally, England at times imported a significant amount from 
past colonies. 
 Countries being co-members of a regional trade agreement (ftaijt) results in a 
significant and positive impact on the value of wheat trade. As expected this 
variable captured the intended benefits of such an agreement aimed at facilitating 
trade between the membership.  Regional trade agreements tend to provide more 
generous access to their members than a multilateral agreement like the WTO and in 
some cases substantially reduced trade barriers for agricultural commodities and 
manufactured products. 
 Membership in the WTO and its precursor GATT (wtoijt) has a negative and 
significant impact. This is in direct contradiction to the expectation regarding the 
ability of trade agreements to facilitate trade. However, Rose (2004) found that there 
was not a direct link between bilateral trade increase and WTO membership. This 
result could reflect the high level of distortionary trade in agriculture industries prior 
to Uruguay. Although the agriculture industry was ruled under GATT, countries 
exploited the numerous loopholes to circumvent the agreement. It was not until the 
Uruguay Rounds initiation in 1986, that countries started to seriously pay attention 
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to agriculture. Given the previous relatively high level of distortions, becoming a 
WTO member may have actually reduced the value of wheat exports from before.  
The purpose of a country being part of a currency union (cuijt) is to help 
manage exchange rate risk. This is expected to have a positive impact on 
international trade in general. However, in this study it is insignificant, suggesting it 
is not an important factor in determining wheat trade. 
 The STE exporter (STEx) and STE importer (STEi) variables together with 
the variables indicating monopoly status (STExM, STEiM) test our main hypotheses 
about the effects of STE in the international trade of wheat. Recall that the presence 
of a STE, and its monopoly status, is based on WTO notification. The STE variables 
require joint analysis given their dichotomous design. First, the STE variable 
describes the impact as result of a country using a STE followed by the additional 
impact that is a result of a STE having a monopoly.  
As was seen in Table 4.2, there were a total of 14 STE exporting wheat in 
1970 and over the 35 years 2 more started and 5 quit. Of the 14 initial STE 
exporters, 9 had monopoly status. In 2005, 2 of the 5 STE that quit had monopoly 
status and in one case the status on single desk was removed. This resulted in 11 
STE exporters in 2005, 6 with monopoly status. There were 34 STE importers and 
of these 16 had monopoly status.  
In terms of there importance in world wheat trade over the period, STEs 
were responsible for 37% of the total wheat trade export transactions and 17% of the 
total transactions involved monopolist STE exporters. STE importers were the 
recipients of 36% of the wheat trade transactions and 16% of all imports were by 
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monopolist importers. More interesting, STE exporters handled approximately 67% 
of the total volume of wheat exports represented in the 35 year study period.  
Monopoly status STE exporters handled about 27% of the volume of wheat trade. 
The volume handled by STE importers was a little different. STE importers 
acquired approximately 54% of the total volume of aggregate wheat imports and the 
ones with monopoly status receiving about 46% of the total volume. 
The impact of state trading exporters is positive and significant in the POLS. 
These results suggest that the use of state trading exporter for wheat increases the 
value of exports from that country. Some STE exporters have monopoly status 
(STExM ) granted to them through domestic legislation. The POLS results reveal the 
fact that a STE has monopoly status does not have an additional positive impact on 
the value of exports from that country.  
Theoretically, one would have expected the use of STE importers to have a 
negative impact on trade. STE importers are commonly thought to have a 
protectionist mandate for the domestic and are thought to inhibit imports. However, 
analyzing the two importing STE variables together the model suggests that the 
impact is positive but only the use of STE importers with monopoly status has a 
significant impact. Using a joint F test, with a calculated F stat of 0.313, by 
including the monopoly variables, not additional explanatory power is found. 
A possible explanation for the insignificant impact of STE importers is that 
some of the countries using them are developing countries. In this situation, these 
agencies are more like trade facilitators rather than. The results suggest that when 
the STE importer has monopoly status they have a positive and significant effect 
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perhaps signaling that the positive role of some monopoly STE importers is 
overwhelming the negative effect (if any) of others. However, sometimes when the 
estimates are strongly significant and have the opposite sign than expected it is 
indicating endogeneity. It could be that the importer has set up a STE monopoly 
because of the high imports 
 If selected variables in the regression are highly significant and the R-square 
is not high, one can suspect that the model is missing information. It should be 
noted that the aggregate trade gravity models characteristically have a high R
2
 
results. It should not necessarily be expected with a single commodity as the trade 
variable. Although there has been some refinement in terms of variable choice, the 
typical gravity model variables may not be as effective at describing the variance 
around wheat trade observations as aggregate trade. 
One obvious obstacle of the POLS for our current research question is that it 
probably cannot fully capture some of the uniqueness in the relationships that may 
exist between a trading pair. If so, then the POLS specification would not 
necessarily be the best estimator.  Testing for the presence of omitted country pair 
effects will indicate whether this is a problem with the POLS. If this is found to be a 
problem, a fixed effects specification is estimated having even more stringent 
estimates than the previous POLS outcome.  
The F test is used to test for the presence of a fixed effect within the data. It 
tests to see if the coefficients from the POLS specification are statistically 
equivalent to the coefficient estimates from the fixed effects estimation.  
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If this is true then the expected outcome (E(Xijt)) would be the same from both the 
POLS estimates (βPOLS) and the fixed effects estimates (βFE).  
Consider that E(Xijt) = (βPOLS+δ)  = (βFE) where  δ is the fixed effect, 
 Ho:  δ=0 (pooled model – i.e. the restricted model) 
 Ha: δ≠0 (fixed effects – i.e. the unrestricted model) 
 Reject H0 if  FCalculated >FCritical 
 
 
/( 1)
31.35
/( )
Calculated
RRSS URSS N
F
URSS NT N K
 
 
   
 1, 1.02CriticalF N NT N K     
 
Since FCalculated > FCritical the result of this test suggests that we fail to accept the null 
and that the POLS specification is NOT the most appropriate. This means that the 
coefficient estimates from the restricted model are not equal to those estimates from 
the unrestricted model. Thus, the presence of fixed effects needs to be accounted for 
in the estimation. This is often required in large panel data analysis. Although Rose 
(2004) ran a two way fixed effect model, it was not emphasis as the correct 
specification. It has been subsequently well document that the gravity model 
requires a country fixed effect (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Subramanian and 
Wei, 2003).  
5.2    Fixed Effect Results 
 A fixed effects regression is the preferred model to use when you want to 
control for omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. It 
is not always possible to identify what the omitted variable(s) are or they may be 
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immeasurable or find a good instrument. The fixed effects estimation is a way to 
isolate the unobservable or immeasurable fixed effect. This estimation method is 
also referred to as the “within” estimator because it uses the variation within each 
cross sectional unit, in our case each country pair, to compute estimates.  
It is further important to determine if the omitted variables that are 
introducing variations between trade pairs is systematic or random. It is then 
necessary to test if the random effects specification estimator is more appropriate 
that the fixed effects.  
The Hausman test is an acceptable procedure to test this hypothesis: 
Ho: Corr(αi,xit) = 0 – i.e. Random Effect 
Ha: Corr(αi,xit) ≠ 0 – i.e. Fixed Effect 
  
Reject H0 if  hLower >hCritical > hUpper  
 
 hUpper ~χ
2
(0.05,52)=69.83  and   hLower ~χ
2
(0.475,52)=51.97 
hCalculated =333.15 
 Since our calculated Hausman statistic does not lie within our critical range, we fail 
to accept the null and believe that the differences in coefficient are systematic, thus 
the fixed effect estimator is most appropriate.   
The test for serial correlation in a fixed effects model requires residual 
analysis to see if there is a relationship between the errors from one period to the 
next (Wooldridge, 2002). The regression of the residuals on the independent 
variable and the lag residual suggested very strongly that the correlation is positive. 
The result is a coefficient estimate of .5558 and a t statistic of 165.79. The 
correction for serial correlation in the fixed effect model for the panel regression 
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model when the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive is the xtregar 
estimator in Stata also with robust standard error correction.  
With this in mind, we recall that econometrically the fixed effects is a very 
stringent estimator. Several things occur when using the fixed effects model. In an 
unbalanced panel, the observations that only occur once are lost from the data set. In 
this sample we lose about 2,900 observations. As an additional consequence of the 
fixed effect transformation, several variables drop out of the estimation or rather are 
subsumed within the fixed effects. These variables are ones that are constant 
between country pairs over time such as distance, island and many of the other 
geographical, historical and colonial variables that do not vary over time.  
The fixed effect model performs well using the wheat trade data and the 
output is provided in columns 2 and 4 of table 5.1. The fixed effects model is run 
using fixed effects to account for both country pair and time affects or otherwise 
known a two-way fixed affects.  In regressing the fixed effects specification, the 
overall explanatory power of the model increases by approximately 8 percent to 
0.328 using the residual squares comparison.  Many of the results in terms of 
magnitude of the coefficient and sign and significance remain robust.  
Analysing the fixed effects result requires some caution. The regression is on 
time demeaned data and the coefficients estimate how the changes in the 
independent variables are causes changes to the dependent variable. The fixed 
effects coefficient estimates and their t statistics are recorded in columns 3 and 6 in 
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Table (5.1). The exporting country‟s productive capacity and output proxy (agYi) is 
still positive and significant indicating that increases in agriculture capacity
6
 above 
the 35 year average in real terms, leads to an increase in the average value (real 
dollars) of wheat exports from the export country. This is a strong result suggesting 
that a productive capacity increases above the average leads to higher than average 
wheat exports.  
The income proxy (Yj) for wheat demand in the import country becomes 
negative and significant for the full model. Since, in the fixed effects model, this 
variable measures deviations from the mean, the coefficient largely reflects cyclical 
effects. There may be substantial variation in these responses among countries 
included in the full sample. Thus, the income variable results are re-examined below 
in different subsamples based on developmental and income status. 
Of course, the geographical and colonial variables drop out of the fixed 
effects estimation, as they are constant over time and are part of the specified fixed 
effects.  
When a wheat exporting country becomes a member of a regional trade 
agreement (ftaij) the value of wheat exports are significantly increased. This is 
evident by the positive and significant coefficient on the regional trade agreement 
variable.  In the fixed effects model the estimate on the coefficient for both 
countries being WTO members (wtoij) becomes positive and significant. The results 
                                                 
 
6
 In most gravity models the exporting country‟s GDP is used to reflect supply. This was used in 
some of the estimation however its performance was inferior to that of agYi.  
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show that for the wheat exporting countries that have become WTO members after 
1970, the value of their exports have risen above their average exports levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to our attention o the key STE variable, the STE exporter variable is 
significant and positive. In the fixed effects model this means that if a country that 
previously did not have a STE exporter, commissions one, wheat exports are 
positively impacted. This is an especially strong result. Similarly, the fixed effect 
model‟s outcome implies that if a country changed its policy and no longer uses a 
STE exporter, the impact of removing the STE exporter will lower the value of the 
Table 5.1 (Replicated) : Empirical Results for Variables Impacting  
Real Value of Wheat Trade between Country Pairs, 
1970 - 2005 
 1 
Variable  
2 
Pooled-OLS 
Model 
3 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
4  
Variable 
List, contd 
5 
Pooled-OLS 
Model, contd 
6 
Fixed Effects 
Model, contd 
agY
i
 
0.346  
(9.920)  
0.059  
(2.17)  ftaij
 
 
1.663  
(7.790)  
0.797  
(5.96)  
Y
j 
 
0.102  
(3.050)  
-0.075  
(-1.67)  wtoij
 
 
-0.453  
(-4.300)  
0.22  
(1.86)  
dist 
0.311  
(4.230)  
d  
 cuij
 
 
-0.186  
(-0.470)  
d  
  
landli  
-0.432  
(-2.020)  
d 
  STEx  
1.739  
(10.220)  
0.649  
(3.17)  
landlj  
-0.806  
(-4.790)  
d 
  STExM  
-0.133  
(-0.660)  
-0.444  
(-1.26)  
islandi  
-0.502  
(-1.670)  
d 
  STEi  
0.084  
(0.530)  
-0.064  
(-0.37)  
islandj  
-0.931  
(-3.730)  
d 
  STEiM  
0.996  
(6.040)  
0.059  
(0.31)  
border  
0.537  
(2.230)  
d 
  cons 
0.623  
(0.490)  
2.5767  
(42.36)  
comcol  
-0.106  
(-0.520)  
d 
  N 19,691  16,792  
comlang  
-0.042  
(-0.270)  
d 
  Adj Rsq  0.242  
 
colony  
0.849  
(2.780)  
d 
  Within Rsq  
 
0.328  
curcol  
-0.557  
(-0.580)  
d 
 
 Source: Author‟s Estimates 
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wheat exports from that country below its previous average. This model is capturing 
the variation in STE policy that was outlined in Table 5.2. It capture the effect on 
the value of wheat trade based on 7 countries who changed their policy with regard 
to STE exporter, 3 who changed their export monopoly status, 37 who changed their 
policy regarding use of a STE importer and the 29 countries who changed their 
import monopoly status. 
In Table 5.2, it shows the extent of trade that is impacted by those countries 
that changed their policy either by adding or removing a STE as well as either 
granting or removing monopoly status to the STE.   
Table 5.2: Wheat Trade For Countries That Changed STE Policy 
 
#  of 
Changes 
Share of 
Observations 
Share of 
Trade Value 
Share of Trade 
Volume 
STE 
Exporter 7 6.24% 5.84% 6.93% 
Export 
Monopoly 3 5.98% 7.18% 7.54% 
STE 
Importer 37 26.48% 36.81% 41.18% 
Import 
Monopoly 29 19.35% 30.01% 31.91% 
 
The model shows that there is no additional effect on the value of wheat 
exports if a country with a monopoly STE exporter removes its monopoly status, or 
if a country with a STE without monopoly power grants single desk status to the 
STE. The insignificance suggests that there is no direct additional value to wheat 
exports in the cases where countries have changed their policy regarding monopoly 
status.  
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The STE importer and the importer monopoly variables are insignificant 
suggesting the initiation or removal of a STE importer has no impact on the value of 
exports into the country regardless of whether that STE is granted monopoly status. 
Recall the initial hypotheses regarding the role of STE exporters and 
importers, with and without monopoly status in world wheat trade. The preferred 
fixed effects model offers a stronger test to investigate the impact that both 
importers and exporters could experience regarding a policy change with respect to 
initiating or removing a STE. The initial hypotheses have been refined to make their 
rejection more onerous.  
- HO.1R:  Initiating a STE Exporter is able to significantly increase the 
value of wheat trade originating from the export country. 
 
- HO.2R: Initiating a Importer is able to significantly decrease the value 
of wheat trade destined for the import country. 
 
The fixed effects model does not allow us to reject our first hypothesis. By 
incorporating a STE exporter, a country may be able to significantly increase the 
value of their wheat exports. Although this is slight deviation of the original 
hypothesis, the POLS results did not allow us to reject the initial hypothesis that the 
presence of a STE exporter has a positive impact on the value of wheat trade.   
On the other hand, our second hypothesis that a STE importer can 
significantly impact the international wheat trade can be rejected. Both of the 
secondary hypotheses regarding the additional impact from STE with monopoly 
status can be rejected.    
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Appendix Table A1.3 provides the estimates from a fixed effects model 
using trade volume rather than value as the dependent variable. The estimates are 
very similar to the regressions based on the value of wheat trade already discussed. 
The productive capacity of the export country is positive and significant. The 
influence of the income variable from the import country varies depending on the 
economic status of that country.  
Although the above results provide interesting insight for the initial 
hypothesis, questions remain as to how widely the results apply to all trading pairs. 
The countries in the sample are very heterogeneous, ranging from very low income 
or developing countries to very affluent and prosperous economies. As earlier 
mentioned, it is partially this context that has stimulated the debate on the differing 
objectives of STEs and the significance of exclusive privileges granted by 
monopoly status. It has been thought that the concern of having a STE monopolist 
in a developed export country is because of the protection it may provide for 
domestic producers. The same concern exists for when the developed country 
import market has a monopolist STE importer. In the case of a developing country, 
the STE concern or objective is focused on the domestic consumer. For this reason, 
the full sample for the analysis above has been disaggregated into sub samples 
based on economic conditions within the import country, the export country or both. 
5.3    Sub Sample Analysis  
There is a great deal of variation with respect to the objective of STEs in 
different countries. It has been argued that different countries use STEs for different 
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reasons. To investigate the robustness of the full sample results for various groups 
of countries the model has been run a number of sub samples. 
One criterion by which the countries included in this study might be 
differentiated is according to development or income status. All countries in the 
study were classified by whether they are members of the OECD, if they are least 
developed country and whether they are high income countries as designated by 
United Nation classification. Further, separate models were estimated for those 
cases where only the exporting country was an OECD country, only the importing 
country and both importer and exporter. Analogous model were estimated in like 
fashion using high income, non OECD members and least developed classifications 
for importer, then exporters and then for both. The full results are record in 
Appendix Table A1.3. Three of the sub sample results are reported in Table 5.3. The 
full sample results are also included in this table.   
In general, the regional trade agreements are more effective in OECD 
countries and in general the WTO has provided a positive impact but in certain 
circumstances it is insignificant. With regard to STEs, including a STE exporter 
increase the volume of exports with no additional volumes exported because the 
STE has monopoly status. STE importers do not significantly affect the volume 
wheat exports. Thus, the same conclusion is drawn about STEs affect on volume of 
wheat trade. 
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To test the impact of STE exporters in developed countries, column 3 
presents the results of the exports to all countries from export countries that are 
OECD countries. The result of this estimation suggests a strong significant and 
positive impact from initiating a STE exporter. It also suggests that the impact to the 
value of exports as a result of granting or removing monopoly status is insignificant. 
Recall that these results are from the fixed effects model and need to be reported as 
showing the impacts of deviations from the past 35 year average. The sample 
comprised of those trades where the exporting country was an OECD member did 
not have any changes regarding the presence of monopoly status for the STE 
exporters so that variable is deleted in the fixed effects model. As for the full model, 
neither the presence of a STE importer, nor the STE importers with monopoly status 
had an impact on wheat trade.  
Table 5.3: Specific Sub Sample Outcomes of STE Influence using Fixed 
Effects Model 
Fixed 
Effects  
 Full    
Sample  
Export Country 
OECD  
Member 
Import Country 
OECD 
Member 
 Import Country 
is Least 
Developed 
STEx 
 
0.649 
(3.17) 
0.59  
(2.01) 
1.684  
(3.45) 
-0.231  
(-0.51) 
STExM 
 
-0.444 
(-1.26) 
d  
- 
-1.098  
(-1.46) 
0.306  
(0.47) 
STEi 
 
-0.064  
(-0.37) 
-0.052  
(-0.28) 
0.658  
(1.42) 
-0.554  
(-1.25) 
STEiM 
0.059  
(0.31) 
0.104  
(0.51) 
0.146  
(0.36) 
0.373  
(0.79) 
N  16,792  13,584  6,002  2,166  
Within R
2 0.328  0.323  0.219  0.562  
Source: Authors Estimates 
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A second sub sample reported in Table 5.3 is made up of the importing 
countries who are OECD members that import from all other countries.  There are a 
few different potential objectives of STE importers. Of particular interest is the use 
of STE importers in developed nations like OECD countries as fronts for 
protectionist policy. If this is the objective, one would expect that the presence of a 
STE importer in OECD countries that import wheat to have a negative impact on the 
value of wheat exports to that country. The evidence from estimating this model 
(found in column 4 of table 5.3) would suggest that instituting a STE importer 
among OECD importers has no effect on wheat trade, regardless of whether or not 
they are granted monopoly status. On the other hand, the influences of exporting 
STEs in this sample (importers are OECD Members) remains positive and 
significant. This shows that the STE exporter exerts a positive and significant 
influence (both columns 3 and 4) where either the importer or exporter is an OECD 
member country. 
 A third subsample reported in column 5 of Table 5.3 is that group of trading 
pairs where the importer is a least developed country. STE importers in developing 
countries have been recognized as trade facilitators in the possible absence of a 
secure investment environment. If this is so, when an exporter sells wheat to the 
least developed countries, the presence of a STE importer would be expected to 
increase the value of the exports compared to not selling to a STE importer. 
However, the results reported here show the STE importer in the least developed 
country to be insignificant. In this model the STE exporter is also insignificant. For 
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example, a wheat exporting country is not expected to experience an increase in 
exports to least developed countries by creating a STE.  
 Additional subsamples for which the fixed effects model was estimated were 
those trading pairs where both the importer and exporter are OECD members, where 
the importer, then the exporter and then both importer and exporter are not OECD 
countries.  The model was also estimated for a subsample where the importers were 
high income, where the exporters were high income and for when both the importer 
and exporter were high income countries. 
  These full results are seen in Appendix table A1.3. The model when both 
importer and exporter are OECD countries returns positive and significant impacts 
by commissioning a STE exporter. Interestingly, when the model is tested on both 
imports and exporters that are not OECD countries the STE export result is again 
significant and positive.  
Most of the other explanatory variables in the model presented in Table A1.3 
are consistent with those for the full sample. The productive capacity of the export 
country is positive and significant. The importing countries‟ income (deviations 
from the mean) variables change sign and significance across subsamples. It is 
insignificant for the OECD countries, positive and significant for the least 
developed importers as expected. For these countries their domestic income 
constraint may be the most binding in terms of their wheat imports. Thus deviations 
are not likely to be present causing significant impact to a consistent purchase of 
wheat. However, the coefficient is negative and significant for those subsamples 
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when the exporters and when both the importer and exporter are high income 
countries. The basis for this cyclical response is unclear. 
The regional trade agreements were shown to be more effective in high 
income and OECD countries. The WTO, like the regional trade agreement, provided 
a positive impact more to the high income and OECD countries.  
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.3    The International Wheat Market 
Wheat is one of the most important food grains in the world and many 
countries both produce and consume wheat. However, the international wheat 
market is a system of a relatively few large exporters and many small buyers (Antle 
and Smith, 1999).  
Over the period of time considered in this study, wheat production has 
doubled from approximately 306 million metric tones to 622 million metric tonnes. 
However, consumption has increased from 317 million metric tonnes to 618 million 
metric tonnes where 16 out of past 35 years there was over consumption (USDA 
PSD, 2007). Similarly, trade in wheat has increased two fold from 56.5 million 
metric tonnes to 115 million metric tonnes (USDA PSD, 2007).   
Operationally, the international wheat market is characterized by a few large 
firms and STEs handling the largest share of the production and several firms on the 
fringe. Appendix Table 1.4, demonstrates that some key exporters that are quite 
large have handled approximately half of the wheat trade during the past 35 years.  
STEs are found among both large and small wheat producing countries. During the 
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period of this study, STE exporters accounted for almost 70% of the value of 
exports (including the U.S.) and STE importers were involved in approximately 
50% of all imports. This is also the pattern for volume of trade as well. Simonot 
(1997) broke down this pattern further by using shorter time periods. His results 
show that the volume of wheat exported by STEs was increasing but the volume 
handled by STE importers is decreasing (Simonot, 1997).  The growth of STE, if 
continued, underlies the concern some countries have regarding the use of STEs as 
an agency for distortionary behaviour and why the use of these agencies generates 
discussion at the WTO in the quest for reforming of the current regulation.  
This research supports our initial hypothesis that despite either the importer 
or exporter country‟s economic situation, the presence of a STE exporter increases 
both the value and volume of exports. The inhibiting role suspected of STE 
importers initially hypothesised was not supported by the analysis.  
6.2    The WTO and Domestic Policy Makers 
 Around the end of WWI and into the WWII period is when STEs started to 
be used as formal trading institutions for some wheat exporting and importing 
countries (Kostecki, 1981).  Article XVII of the GATT 1994 is the primary 
international regulation influencing the operation of STEs. This regulation 
surrounding the notification requirement for the use of STEs has existed since 1947.  
It was not until early 1958 that the first deadline to report STE was mandatory 
(WTO, 2007). Since then reliance on a voluntary notification has created a 
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contentious debate on what constitutes a STE, as well as their impacts on trade. 
(WTO, 2007) 
  On 17 July 2007 Ambassador Crawford Falconer, chairperson of the 
agriculture negotiations at the WTO, circulated his 45-page revised draft modalities 
which call for the elimination of  the use of export monopoly powers for STEs by 
2013 (WTO, 2007). The implied assumption is that removal monopoly power alone 
is expected to eliminate the distortions observed in the international wheat market 
created by STEs. This item in the modalities draft relies on the presumption that 
having monopoly status is the most significant source distortion created by using 
STE. Given the findings reported in this research, this assumption may not be well 
founded and careful reconsideration is needed.  
As previously mentioned, there has been a plethora of approaches used to 
develop taxonomies to classify STE based on their ability to distort trade. This study 
has provided a very extensive and comprehensive technique to assess overall impact 
of all STEs in the international wheat market. This methodology could possibly be 
used in other sectors of the economy as well. 
This methodology and the results are key developments in a systematic 
investigation of the distortionary impacts of STEs. Responding to the importance 
and attention directed to STEs in the international wheat trade, this broad 
assessment has made a significant contribution in providing evidence with respect to 
alleged impacts caused by STEs, with or without monopoly status.  
Although the empirical study indicates that the presence of a STE exporter 
leads to an increase in the value of wheat exports, especially those in OECD 
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countries, these generalized results may not directly be indicative of a particular 
STE‟s ability or lack there of to impact trade. Similarly, while no evidence was 
found of the inhibiting influence of STE importer, individual STEs may influence 
trade for reasons unique to their circumstance. 
It must also be noted that our results are based on the WTO definition of 
STEs and their monopoly status, which is in turn the result of reporting by member 
countries. As has been noted in Chapter I, there is a great deal of variation in how 
researchers and trading countries define STEs. The results reported here must be 
interpreted in terms of the WTO definitions of STEs. 
6.3    The Methodology 
 The gravity model used for this research works well for testing policy 
impacts over time as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the literature. The gravity 
model has been shown to have strong theoretical underpinnings and to be a useful 
tool in policy analysis. While the gravity model is most often applied in aggregate 
trade, it was adjusted to model trade between many countries for one commodity, 
wheat. The large and comprehensive data set utilized in this research spans 35 years 
of wheat trade between 180 countries, thus ensuring sufficient degrees of freedom 
for a high level of confidence in the results. The use of econometric estimation and 
testing provided evidence about the relationship between STEs and wheat trade. The 
results speak to the influence of STEs on average over the specified time period. 
Analysis of specific STEs should be considered in drawing conclusions about the 
influence of individual organizations. 
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The POLS model produces estimates consistent with conventional gravity 
model estimations. However, even by including a number of geographic, historical 
and institutional variables, the econometric tests indicated the presence of a fixed 
effect. Both time and country trade pair fixed effects were included. It is noteworthy 
that even in the very stringent fixed effects model the STE exporter variable retains 
its significant and positive influence on trade. 
6.4    Future Research Opportunities  
This study found that the presence of STE exporters increase both the value 
and volume of exports. Does this mean that they should be banned or further 
investigated? Should there be additional research into what specifically it is about 
STEs that leads to the observed result given that it is not monopoly status?  
Future research on this field could address the following issues that were not 
covered in this study: 
1) Developing a balanced panel and using specific estimation procedure to 
further test policy variables. 
2) Using different estimations procedures to test specific cross sections of 
the data. 
3) Testing other possible specifications of key policy variables. 
4) Using procedure to incorporate and to estimate the effect of time-
invariant variables. 
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Table A1.1: Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. 
ltradevalcon Log of Value of Wheat 
(100190) Exports levels in 
1990 U.S. dollars ($). 
UN Comtrade – 
Author‟s Calculation 
13.778 3.243 
ltravevol(MT) Log of Weight (MT) of 
Wheat (100190) Exports. 
Author‟s Calculation of  
UN Comtrade 
8.724 3.598 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
    
ftaij
  
 
Binary indicating mutual 
membership in a Regional 
Trade Agreement.  
Author‟s modification 
to Dr. A Rose Dataset 
0.157 0.364 
wtoij
  
 
Binary indicating the 
countries are both 
GATT/WTO members.  
Author‟s modification 
to Dr. A Rose Dataset 
0.691 0.461 
cuij
  
 
Binary indicating if the 
country pair is in a strict 
currency union.  
Author‟s modification 
to Dr. A Rose Dataset 
0.033 0.179 
 
SUPPLY 
    
agYi 
 
 
Log of value of 
agricultures contribution 
to GDP in Constant (1990) 
U.S. dollars ($).  
United Nations (UN) 
National Accounts 
 
23.411 
1.709 
 
DEMAND 
    
Yj 
 
 Log of GDP in Constant 
(1990) U.S. dollars ($). 
United Nations (UN) 
National Accounts 
24.444 2.236 
 
STATE TRADE 
ENTERPRISE 
    
STEx  
 
Binary indicating the 
presence of a STE for the 
exports of Wheat.  
Notification to WTO 
Documentation & 
academic papers  
0.364 0.481 
STExM  
 
Binary indicating the 
presence of a STE with 
monopoly status for the 
exports of Wheat  
Notification to WTO 
Documentation & 
academic papers  
0.171 0.376 
STEi  
Binary indicating the 
presence of a STE for the 
imports of Wheat  
Notification to WTO 
Documentation & 
academic papers  
0.346 0.475 
STEiM  
 
Binary indicating the 
presence of a STE with 
monopoly status for the 
imports of Wheat  
Notification to WTO 
Documentation & 
academic papers  
0.253 0.434 
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Table A1.1(continued): Variable Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. 
 
GEOGRAPHIC 
    
ldist 
 
Log of Distance (km) between 
countries Trading Countries.  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions of 
distance b/w 
capital cities 
7.549 1.109 
landlR Binary indicating Reporter country 
is landlocked.  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.065 0.247 
landlP Binary indicating Partner country is 
landlocked  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.124 0.331 
islandR Binary indicating Reporter country 
is island 
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.057 0.232 
islandP Binary indicating partner country is 
island 
 
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.093 0.291 
border Binary indicating a shared border 
 
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.142 0.349 
comcol Binary indicating if the country pair 
has a common colonizer after 1945 
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.048 0.214 
comlang Binary indicating the country pair 
shares a common language.  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.255 0.436 
comctry Binary indicating the country pair 
had the same colonizer.  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
9.787 0.009 
colony Binary indicating if the pair was 
ever in a colonial relationship 
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.071 0.255 
curcol Binary indicating the country pair 
is currently in a colonial 
relationship  
Rose Dataset 
& Author‟s 
Additions  
0.009 0.0969 
timed Time dummy takes a unique value 
indicating the period (1970 = 0: 
2005 = 35) 
Author‟s 
Inclusion 
 
 
  
Source: A K. Rose: Recent Research-.http:// www. faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm 
 
 93 
 
 
Table A1.2:  Value of Wheat Trade Results,  including Subsamples  
CFE JULY17 Full Sample OECD Importer OECD Exporter Both OECD 
Non-OECD 
Importer 
Non-OECD   
Exporter 
Both     Non-
OECD    
N of obs 16792 6002 13584 5213 10731 3088 11491 
N of groups 2013 600 1267 388 1453 769 1673 
within  R2 0.3283 0.2199 0.3233 0.1997 0.4058 0.0352 0.4035 
between  R2 0.0081 0.1196 0.0001 0.1207 0.0121 0.0274 0.0333 
overall  R2 0.0021 0.0532 0.0006 0.063   0.0105 
 
F(43,14736) 
167.51 
F(43,5359)  
 35.13 
F(42,12275)  
139.66 
F(42,4783) 
 28.42 
F(43,9235) 
 146.68 
F(43,2276)  
32.16 
 
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.0534 0.074 -0.068 0.0894 0.0038  -0.011 
        
ftaij 
 
0.797 1.214 1.006 1.245 0.369 -0.207 0.467 
5.96 6.59 6.92 6.61 1.67 -0.58 2.13 
wtoij 
 
0.221 0.257 0.138 4.792 0.342 0.516 0.354 
1.86 0.41 1.02 1.65 2.92 1.98 3.05 
agYi 
 
0.059 0.041 0.047 0.064 0.098 0.09 0.072 
2.17 1.13 1.5 1.64 2.09 1.43 1.77 
Yj 
 
-0.075 0.058 -0.097 -0.083 0.059 0.205 0.071 
-1.67 0.3 -2.08 -0.39 1.21 1.34 1.51 
STEx 
 
0.649 1.684 0.59 1.225 0.273 0.493 0.477 
3.17 3.45 2.01 2.2 1.25 1.65 2.35 
STExM 
 
-0.444 -1.098 d d -0.43 -0.832 -0.687 
-1.26 -1.46 d d -1.12 -1.05 -1.82 
STEi 
 
-0.064 0.658 -0.052 0.707 -0.131 -0.429 -0.18 
-0.37 1.42 -0.28 1.45 -0.71 -0.93 -0.97 
STEiM 
0.059 0.146 0.104 0.4584 -0.12 -0.205 -0.073 
0.31 0.36 0.51 1.53 -0.57 -0.38 -0.35 
_cons 2.576 3.331 2.723 3.889 2.324 1.438 2.141 
 42.36 27.03 39.97 29.2 33.31 8.76 31.26 
rho_ar 0.644 0.632 0.650 0.635 0.639 0.621 0.638 
sigma_u 2.764 2.858 2.738 2.873 2.582 2.794 2.650 
 0.748 1.730 1.565 1.715 1.503 1.747 1.523 
rho_fov 3.44 0.731 0.753 0.737 0.746 0.718 0.751 
 F(2012,1476) 
F(599,5359) 
3.85 
F(387,4783) 
469 
F(1452,9235)    
30.02 
F(768,2276) 
21 
F(1672,9775)    
30.03 
F(284,1838) 
269 
 P>F= 1 P>F= 0  P>F = 0 P>F = 0.0 P>F = 0 P>F = 0 
 
CFE JULY17 Full Sample 
Least Developed 
Importer 
High Income 
Importer 
High Income 
Exporter 
Both High Income 
 
Number of obs 16792 2166 6423 13084 5219 
Numberof 
groups 
2013 285 635 1147 353 
within  R2 0.3283 0.5624 0.232 0.3295 0.218 
between  R2 0.0081 0.3018 0.0117 0.0001 0.0071 
overall  R2 0.0021 0.1733 0.0029 0.0006 0.0002 
 
F(43,14736) 
167.51 
F(43,1838) 
 54.94 
F(43,5745) 
 40.36 
F(42,11895) 
 139.21 
F(42,4824)  
32.03 
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.0534 0.195 -0.0737 -0.0851  
      
ftaij 0.797 -0.279 1.015 1.105 1.298 
 5.96 -0.46 5.47 7.33 6.44 
wtoij 0.221 0.144 0.704 0.088 0.46 
 1.86 0.56 1.93 0.66 0.85 
agY
i
 0.059 0.365 0.048 0.05 0.068 
 2.17 3.11 1.41 1.64 1.95 
Y
j
 -0.075 0.34 -0.183 -0.098 -0.359 
 -1.67 1.91 -1.31 -2.12 -2.28 
STEx 0.649 -0.231 1.473 0.504 0.646 
 3.17 -0.51 3.12 1.73 1.26 
STExM -0.444 0.306 -0.992 d d 
 -1.26 0.47 -1.41 d d 
STEi -0.064 -0.554 0.319 -0.079 0.414 
 -0.37 -1.25 0.78 -0.42 0.98 
STEiM 0.059 0.373 0.236 0.128 0.174 
 0.31 0.79 0.61 0.63 0.45 
_cons 2.576 1.634 3.309 2.702 3.947 
 42.36 13.34 30.87 39.94 33.53 
rho_ar 0.644 0.641 0.663 0.655 0.669 
sigma_u 2.764 2.017 2.918 2.815 3.189 
 0.748 1.224 1.667 1.528 1.607 
rho_fov 3.44 0.730 0.753 0.772 0.797 
 F(2012,1476) 
F(634,5745) 
361 
F(1146,11895)  
4.23 
F(352,4824) 
473 
F(1266,12275) 
4.01 
 P>F= 1 P>F = 0 P>F = 0 P>F = 0 P>F= 0 
Source: Author’s Estimates, t ststistic recorded below estimates 
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Table A1.3:  Volume of Wheat Trade Results,  including Subsamples  
VOLUME 
FULL 
Model 
OECD 
Importer 
OECD 
Exporter 
OECD 
Both 
Least 
Developed 
Importer 
High 
Income 
Importer 
High 
Income 
Exporter 
Both 
High 
Income 
N of obs 16792 6002 5213 3088 2166 6423 13084 5219 
N of groups 2013 600 388 769 285 635 1147 353 
within R2 0.116 0.066 0.059 0.166 0.312 0.067 0.120 0.064 
between  R2 0.016 0.114 0.137 0.011 0.190 0.018 0.008 0.0002 
overall  R2 0.009 0.101 0.120 0.012 0.064 0.016 0.008 0.005 
F 45.21 8.85 7.23 10.54 19.4 9.73 38.74 7.96 
corr(u_i,Xb) -0.043 0.076 0.104 -0.097 0.042 -0.085 -0.068 -0.144 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
ftaij 
0.960 
6.63 
1.3135 
6.5 
1.3672 
6.6 
-
0.2259 
-0.59 
-0.4845-
0.77 
1.0906 
5.37 
1.3368 
8.19 
1.4183 
6.43 
wtoij 
0.219 
1.7 
0.4428 
0.64 
4.9305 
1.56 
0.6428 
2.33 
0.14 
0.52 
0.8308 
2.08 
0.0541 
0.37 
0.5159 
0.87 
cuij dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd 
agYi 
0.066 
2.22 
0.0479 
1.21 
0.085 
1.96 
0.067 
2.1 
0.3819 
3.14 
0.0579 
1.54 
0.0625 
1.89 
0.0912 
2.35 
Yj 
-0.138 
-2.82 
0.0465 
0.22 
-0.1047 
-0.44 
0.1419 
0.87 
0.3004 
1.62 
-0.2478 
-1.62 
-0.1637 
-3.25 
-0.417 
-2.42 
STEx 
0.806 
3.63 
2.0761 
3.88 
1.6502 
2.7 
0.6267 
1.98 
-0.1885 
-0.4 
1.8107 
3.51 
0.7418 
2.35 
1.0454 
1.87 
STExM 
-0.450 
-1.18 
-1.2878 
-1.56 dd 
-
0.8406 
-1 
0.6151 
0.91 
-1.0917 
-1.42 dd dd 
STEi 
0.038 
0.2 
0.7079 
1.39 
0.8041 
1.5 
-
0.2894 
-0.59 
-0.4683 
-1.02 
0.3371 
0.75 
0.0043 
0.02 
0.45 
0.97 
STEiM 
0.019 
0.1 
0.3275 
0.73 dd 
-
0.4591 
-0.81 
0.2624 
0.53 
0.3886 
0.92 
0.1429 
0.64 
0.352 
0.83 
constant 
2.741 
41.36 
3.5117 
25.47 
2.4575 
32.98 
2.2769 
31.07 
1.5155 
12.53 
3.4722 
9.2 
2.8445 
38.6 
4.1485 
32.01 
         
rho_ar 0.642 0.624 0.640 0.638 0.662 0.657 0.653 0.667 
sigma_u 3.012 3.218 2.797 2.908 2.240 3.286 3.008 3.344 
sigma_e 1.740 1.910 1.606 1.628 1.250 1.833 1.657 1.761 
rho_fov 0.749 0.739 0.752 0.761 0.762 0.762 0.767 0.782 
F 3.58 4.01 3.15 3.23 2.62 3.86 4.37 4.87 
Prob>F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Author’s Estimates, t statistics reported below estimates 
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WTO Notification of STE Document  
 
Questionnaire on State Trading 
 
I. Enumeration of State-trading enterprises 
Does your country maintain enterprises covered by the provisions of Article XVII? If so, list the 
products or groups of products for which a State enterprise is maintained or for which an 
enterprise has exclusive or special privileges. 
 
II. Reason and purpose for introducing and maintaining State-trading Enterprises State for each 
product the reason and purpose for introducing and maintaining the enterprise (it should be 
indicated, for example, whether the purpose for the effect of the enterprise is to prevent prices to 
consumers from exceeding certain maximum limits, or to protect domestic producers by the 
control of imports and/or the purchase of domestic supplies at above world price levels, or to 
facilitate export sales, or to make it possible to establish or administer a stabilization  
arrangement). A description of the legal provisions should be included so far as this has not been 
submitted in earlier notifications. 
 
III. Description of the functioning of the State-trading enterprises 
Describe, item by item, the functioning of such enterprises and state in particular: 
- Whether the enterprise deals with exports or with imports, or both. 
- Whether private traders are allowed to import or export and, if so, on what conditions. 
Whether there is free competition between private traders and the State-trading enterprise. 
- The criteria used for determining the quantities to be exported and imported. 
- How export prices are determined. How the mark-up on imported products is determined. How 
export prices and the re-sale prices of imports compare with domestic prices. 
- Whether long-term contracts are negotiated by the State-trading enterprise. Whether 
State-trading methods are used to fulfill contractual obligations entered into by the Government. 
 
IV. Statistical information 
Furnish statistics (where possible by quantity and value) of imports, exports and national 
production on the products notified, on the following lines: 
(a) the figures should cover the last three available years; 
(b) the figures for the three groups (imports, exports and national production) should be 
given, where possible, in a comparable form; 
(c) the figures should be broken down so as to show: 
(i) trade by the enterprise; 
(ii) other trade. 
 
V. Reason why no foreign trade has taken place (if this is the case) in products affected 
In cases where no foreign trade has taken place in the products affected, state the reasons. 
 
VI. Additional information 
Provide any additional information that may be appropriate. 
 
Source: http://e-fpo.fpo.go.th/e-inter/WTO_training/eol/e/pdf/notstr1.pdf 
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Appendix Table A 1.4: Percentage of Trade Value and Volume of Selected Exporters 
 
Percentage of Sample 
Observation 
Percentage of Total 
Trade Value 
Percentage of Total 
Trade Volume 
USA 
15.64% 34.76% 35.20% 
Canada 
10.27% 20.50% 19.63% 
Australia 
4.29% 7.11% 7.47% 
Argentina 
4.33% 5.64% 6.64% 
France 
10.56% 17.39% 15.02% 
UK 
3.87% 2.57% 2.62% 
Total ∑ 
48.97% 87.97% 86.58% 
